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CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND 
1 .1 I NTRODUCTI ON 
"Admi nistrative t heory is pec uliarly the theory of 
intended and bounded rationality - of the 
behavior of human beings who satisfice because 
they have not the wits to maximize" 
Herbert A Simon, Administrative Behaviour. 
"We should view decision making itself as an 
effortful activity" 
Harvey Leibenste in, General X-Efficiency Theory and 
Economic Underdevelopment 
Writing thirty-five years ago, R S Edwards (1952) noted that as an 
economist who was once an accountant he had "been following with some 
perplexity the recent controversy in this country (United Kingdom) and the 
United States on the influences determining prices in manufacturing 
industry" (p 298). He explained that he was surprised tha t economists 
should find the practice of cost-plus pricing "a significant discovery" (p 
298) and that he was also surprised that "the existence of these procedures 
should have led to serious questioning of the validity of the marginal 
approach in economic analysi s" (p 298). He observed that ru les of thumb 
are sometimes used in practice and commented "that these rules of thumb are 
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not always as satisfactory as they might be and sometimes they are 
downright stupid. But it surely does not follow that, because mistakes are 
sometimes made in business practice, the marginal analysis, which is merely 
a method of stating formal qualities of sensible behaviour, is inapplicable 
as a general approach" (p 298). 
Thirty-five years later, as an accountant who was once a student of 
economics, and noting the extent to which some economists have gone in 
absorbing the managerial and behaviourial schools into their theory of the 
firm, I am now espeCially surprised at the ease with which accountants, 
both professional and academi c , dismiss the applicability of the 
marginalist approach 1. 
Using analytical techniques, this study will examine the accountant's 
pricing theories and the factors influencing the accountant when he makes 
a pricing decision and will compare the accountant's marginalist approach 
to the economic theory from which it is derived and examine the validity of 
the reasons given in accounting theory for the widespread exclUSion of the 
application of the profit maximizing pricing decision model. 
1.2 THE MAJOR APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Pricing behaviour is studied by economists in the theory of the firm in 
microeconomics. In microeconomic theory three main approaches to the study 
of the firm can be identified; neoclassical theory, managerial theory and 
1. See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (1985) 
and Garrison (1985: p 503) and Killough and Leininger (1984: p 356). 
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behavioural theory. 
(i) Neoclassical Theory 
In neoclassical theory the firm is an "heuristic fiction,,2 which attempts 
to maximise profit . Based on the assumption that the firm attempts to 
maximise profits, neoclassical theory explains the price at which the 
seller offers his product for sale in terms of the profit maximising 
pricing model. Accounting for the nature of the behaviour of costs and 
revenues in relation to volume produced and sold, the economist then sees 
price being set at t he level" at which margi nal revenue is equal to marginal 
cost, which is the level at which t otal revenue exceeds total cost by the 
greatest amount and is thus the pOint at which profit is maximised. This 
will be examined in more detail later in this chapter. Led by such names 
as Friedman (1962), Machlup (1967) and Papendreou (1958), most neoclassical 
studies of the firm today are pos itivist studies. 
(ii) Managerial Theory 
Focussing on the ever increasing separation of ownership from control in 
corporations, following pioneering work by Berle and Means (1932), the 
managerial theory of the firm holds that managers have the discretion to 
deviate from the profit maximisation goal, which may maximise the 
shareholders' utility, and instead to maximise functions which maximise 
their own uti lity as they perceive it. Led to prominence by Baumol (1959), 
2. See Machlup (1967: 27). 
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revenue maximisation is frequently presented as an alternative to profit 
maximisation. The issue as to what are the alternative objectives of the 
firm and how they affect the validi t y of the profit maximising pricing 
model will be examined in chapter 5. 
(iii) Behaviourial Theory 
Introducing organisational theory into the study of the theory of the firm 
the behavioural theorists focussed rather on the formation of corporate 
goals as opposed to their attainment. 
Herbert Simon (1955) in his path breaking article explained that their 
approach was to "explore possible ways of formulating the process of 
rational choice" (101). He explained that their focus on the actual 
process of the decision takes into account the limits to rational 
maximisation behaviour. 
Leading behavioural theorists, Cyert and March, also explained that one of 
their research commitments was that they wished to study the decisions "by 
studying the process" (1963: 2). 
Herbert Simon (1959) in another, also much celebrated article, summarised 
the attacks on the hypothesis that the entrepreneur strives to maximise 
profits. In that article he stated, "The entrepreneur may not care to 
maximise, but may simply want to earn a return that he regards as satis-
factory" (262). He said that satisficing "is a concept more meaningfully 
related to the psychological notion of aspiration levels than to 
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maximisat ion" (262 ) . 
Thompson ( 1981 ) sums up the philosophy of t he behavioural theorists saying, 
"The thesis is that management decision makers are content to go with 
workable or satisfactory solutions and courses of action rather than 
undert aking the more burdensome chore of figuring out the very best 
alternative at each and every fork" (302). 
Succinctly put by Simon (1957): "Administrative theory is peculiarly the 
theory of intended and bounded rationality - of the behaviour of human 
beings who satisfice because they have not the wits to maximise" (24). 
Having considered the three major approaches to the theory of the firm 
under which pri c ing is studied by the economist, the accountant's percep-
tion of the firm and pricing must now be considered. 
1.3 THE ACCOUNTANT'S FIRM VERSUS THE ECONOMIST'S FIRM 
The area of accounting which studies the pricing behaviour of the firm is 
cost and management accounting. Barret and Bruns (1985) have stated that 
"management accounting is designed to help make things happen and then 
measure what has happened" (1). The National Association of Accountants 
(NAA) has defined management accounting as "the process of identification, 
measurement , accumulation, analysis, preparation, interpretation, and 
communication of financial information used by management to plan , 
evaluate, and control within an organisation and to assure appropriate use 
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of and accountability for its resources".3 
It is noteworthy that managerial accountants usually refer to an "organisa-
tion,,4 whereas the microeconomist refers to the "firm". 
It is submitted that the crux of the matter in reconciling the accountant's 
perception of the pricing decision to that of the economist is to recognise 
the difference between the entity (firm or organisation) considered by the 
accountant and the one considered by the economist. 
In Machlup's (1967) famous presidential address to the American Economic 
Association, he explained that the economist's firm is an "imaginary 
reactor" (27). He stressed that it" is a pure construct for whi ch there 
need not exist an empirical counterpart" (27). He explained that to 
confuse the imaginary firm with a "real" firm would be to "confuse a 
heuristic fiction with a real organisat ion like General Motors or Atlantic 
and Pacific" (9), which is "to commit the falacy of misplaced correctness" 
( 9) . 
This "heuristic fiction" of a firm is something altogether different from 
the organisation which the managerial accountant studies. Garrison (1985) 
makes it clear that "managerial accounting is concerned with providing 
information to managers, that is, those who are inside an organisation" 
(3). Further, he unambiguously defines this organisation saying: 
3. See Killough and Leinenger (1984: 5). 
4. See Garrison (1985: 3) and Horngren (1982: 9). 
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"An organisation can be defined as a group of people 
united for some common purpose. A bank providing 
financial services is an organisation, as is a 
university providing educational services, the General 
Electric Company providing appliances and other 
products" (3). 
Garrison's (1985) specific inclusion of the General Electric Company and 
Machlup's (1967) specific exclusion of a real organisation with a name like 
General Motors starkly emphasise the very core of the difference between 
the accountant 's entity and the economist's entity. 
Thus the accountant has the task of ass i st ing in the achievement of the 
goals of a specific, real organisation. Read together with the National 
Association of Accountants' definition of management account ing5, it 
becomes clear that the purpose of the management accountant is to assist in 
the task of achieving the objectives of a real organisation. 
As a result of the fact that the accountant has this specific task of 
assisting in the achievement of the objectives of a specific, real 
organisation, he normally has a specific contractual obligation (be it 
employee/employer or consultant/client) with some or other party requiring 
him in general and sometimes specific terms to employ his skills towards 
the interests of that party . The crux of the matter is that as a result of 
5. See page 5 of this chapter. 
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knowingly and willingly entering into such a legal contract (and being 
legal requires that it is not in contra bona mores) he acquires a legal, 
and many wou ld perhaps say also a moral, obligation to then apply his 
skills in the interests of the other party in terms of the contract. 
When this specific obligation of the accou ntant to another party is 
considered together with the modern organisation's feature of separation of 
ownership from control and the resultant scope for goal incongruence 
between managers and shareho lders , then it becomes clear that the question 
of exactly whose interests the accountant serves when he works on a pricing 
decision, deserves much closer attent ion than it has so far received. 
The work of Harvey Leibenstein (1978) the pioneer of X-efficiency theory, 
is perti nent in this regard. Examining the profit maximisation assumption 
of neocla ss ical microeconomic theory, Leibenstein (1978) pointed out that 
the inputs of a firm "can be used with various degrees of effectiveness" 
(17). If the input is not used effect ively then the corresponding 
dimunition in output is a measure of x-inefficiency. The present study 
considers that this notion of x-ineffic iency could be very helpful in 
analysing the pricing decision. It is suggested that it is highly 
pertinent that Leibenstein (1978) explained that effective use of the 
fi rm' s inputs depends not only an actual performance but a Iso on "the 
decisions that are made on how to use the inputs" (18). 
Concerning the decision on how to use the inputs we must note that 
Lei benste in (1978) perceived that agents may have diff~rent interests from 
their principals. He said that "they may also make decisions which 
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emphasise their own interests irrespective of whether they are in the 
principal's interest" (27). He also drew attention to the fact that in the 
performance of activities there exists for individual s "an infinity of 
effort points to choose from,,6 and that, of course, individuals will not 
always choose to be 100% effortful. Further, he postulated that "we should 
expect different effort levels on the part of the agent compared to those 
of the principal" (10). Perhaps, most pertinent of all, he declared that 
"we should view decision making itself as an effortful activity" (28). 
Viewed against t hi s background it is thus submitted that i t is urgently 
necessary to examine carefully the accountant's pricing theory and 
pract i ce s. 
1.4 PRICING MODELS 
Both accountants and economists recognise two generic pricing philosophies; 
that is, "profit maximising" and "cost plus markup" pricing strategies. In 
order to examine the accountant's version of the "profit maximising" 
pricing model it is necessary first to illustrate in more detail the 
"profit maximising" pricing model of economic theory from which the 
accountant's model is derived. 
Assuming that under most forms of competition, price reductions will be 
necessary to sell more units and that the cost of additional units of 
products is not constant, the economists construct a model as shown in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
6. See Leibenstein (1978: 28). 
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Figure 2: Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost Curves (MR, MC) 
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Thi s can be illustrated with data from an example in Killough and Leinenger 
(1986: 353-357) of a firm with revenue and cost functions as follows: 
Let; x = number of units of output 
R = total revenue function 
C = total cost function 
MR = marginal revenue function 
MC = marginal cost function 
If; R = 84x 4x 2 
x3 
and C 2 20x + 183 = - - 4x + 
3 
MR can then be found by different i ati ng the total revenue function with 
respect to output: 
R = 84x 1 _ 4x 2 
dR 
-= 
dx 
dR 
- = 84 - 8x 
dx 
dR 
Thus MR = - = 84 - 8x 
dx 
(1) 
(3) 
MC can be found by differentiating the total cost function with respect 
to output : 
x3 
C = - - 4x2 + 20x 1 + 183 
3 
dc 
= 3 
dx 
3-1 x 
3 
(2 ) 
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dC 
MC = = x2 - 8x + 20 (4 ) 
dx 
Setting the marginal revenue equal to the marginal cost and solving for 
x, one finds the output that results in maximum profit: 
MR = MC (5 ) 
84 - 8x = x2 - 8x + 20 
x = 8 
Thus the firm should produce 8 units of output to maximise profit. From 
equation (3) and equation (4) it can be seen that margi na I revenue and 
marginal cost are both equal to R20 at an output of 8 units. 
This optimum profit figure can be verified by determining the profit 
function . Let the profit be P. 
P = R - C 
_x3 
P =-+ 64x - 183 
3 
The output which maXlmlses profit can be 
profit functions with respect to output, 
to zero and checking for a maximum: 
dP 
_x2 + 
- = 64 
dx 
0 = _x2 + 64 
x = 8 
(6 ) 
found by differentiating the 
setting the derivatives equal 
This verifies the profit maximising output set earlier. 
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Thus the economist's model states that the price for a product which 
maximises profit is the one associated with the volume of output at which 
marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. 
Now what is the accountant's theory and practice of pricing? Partly due to 
the fact that the accountant's data is the main data base in cost plus 
markup pricing, it is frequently perceived, especially by economists, that 
the accountant only studies and practices cost plus markup pricing. 
Oxenfeldt and Baxter (1961) commented: "It is genera lly true tha t the 
cost accountant fails to state his assumptions about the firm's aims and 
pays scant attention to demand; he collects cost data and arrives at a 
price by manipulating these" (77). 
The truth is, as stated earlier, that accountants also recognise two 
generic pricing philosophies; that is, "profit maximising" and "cost plus 
markup" pricing strategies. This is evidenced by the fact that 
publications of professional accountants7 and the standard texts on 
managerial accou nting8 explain both a profit maximising model and a cost-
plus approach. 
In reconciling the accountant's profit maximising model to the economist's 
model from which it is derived it must be noted that the accountant's total 
7. See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1965) publica-
tion "Cost analysis for Pricing and Distribution Policies". 
8. See Garrison (1985: 499-523) and Koplan (1982: 221-236) and Arnold 
and Hope (1983: 151) and Polimeni, Fabozzi and Adelberg (1986 : 756-
758) . 
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cost curve is typically linear. He acknowledges that it is true that each 
additional unit produced will possibly never increase total cost by an 
amount exactly equal to the increase of the previous unit of output. 
Nevertheless he considers that ranges of volumes of production exist within 
which each extra unit of output will increase total cost by an amount which 
is not materially different from the previous unit's increase of cost. 
Thus, within such ranges of production, the accountant envisages a linear 
relationship between volume and cost, with variable cost per unit equal to 
marginal cost per unit. Over the ful l range of volumes, the slope of this 
total cost curve would, of course, change several times, as, for example, 
discount quantity barriers and normal time to overtime barriers are broken; 
and it would also be stepped as fixed costs change. 
When the accountant feels that he can assume that fixed costs in total and 
variable costs per unit will not change materially for the relevant range 
of volume being considered, he makes a simplifying assumption t hat the 
total cost curve can be represented as in Figure 3. 
When total fixed costs and variable costs per unit are expected to change 
materially and the economist's total revenue function is recognised, the 
accountant obtains a profit maximising pricing decision model which could 
produce total revenue and total cost curves as represented in Figure 4. 
It can then be seen that when we recognise a linear relationship between 
cost and volume, with a total cost curve of changing slope, there could 
easily be a number of prices (with associated volumes) at which marginal 
15 
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revenue would be equal to marginal cost, and thus the equality of marginal 
revenue and marginal cost will not necessarily be decisive in determining 
the profit maximising price and output level. Here (Figure 4) marginal 
revenue is equal to marginal cost at price P1 and at price P2. For this 
reason, when approaching pricing with the profit maximising pricing model, 
the accountant focuses on total revenue and total cost, not marginal 
revenue and marginal cost. 
Of course, this is reconcilable to the economist's model in that, with the 
economist's total revenue and cost curves in Figure 1, the profit increases 
all the time as volume increases , whilst marginal revenue is greater than 
marginal cost, since the total revenue curve is moving further away from 
the total cost curve. Once marginal revenue becomes smaller than marginal 
cost, the total revenue curve moves closer to the marginal cost curve and 
profit is then decreasing. Thus just before the level of volume at which. 
the total revenue curve begins moving towards the total cost curve, it is 
parallel to the total cost curve; and until then, as volume increases so 
does profit. Where the curves are parallel, marginal revenue is equal to 
marginal cost and thus the point at which total revenue exceeds total cost 
by the greatest amount is also the point at which marginal revenue is equal 
to marginal cost. 
The second pricing philosophy which accountants study is, of course, "cost 
plus markup" pricing. Garrison (1985) comments "the most common approach 
to the pricing of standard products is to employ some type of cost-plus 
pricing formula" (504). 
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Whilst much det ailed work and difficult arbitrary allocations of overhead 
to product are required in calculating a "cost" of a product, the technique 
i s a simple and easily understood one - as explained in Garrison (1985): 
"The approach is to compute a I cost I base and then to add 
to this base some predetermined markup to arrive at a 
target selling price" (504). 
Sometimes the markup is simply a traditional rule of thumb and sometimes, 
in its most sophisticated form, the markup is structured to try to achieve 
a desired return on investment, based on estimated costs and expected 
volume. In any form, the target price is then assessed as to its viability 
and is then adjusted down to "what the market can bear" if necessary. This 
step of adjusting down to "what the market can bear", of course, covers a 
multitude of s ins and will be exami ned in more detail in chapter 3. 
Horngren (1981) explained that circular logic is employed in target return 
pricing because the markup is determined by cost and cost is partially 
determined by volume which is itself partially determined by the mark-up.9 
He also pOints out that the plus in cost-plus is rarely an unalterable 
markup. "Its magnitude depends on the behaviour of competitors and 
customers" (94-95). 
Nevertheless, managerial accounting textbooks quickly dismiss profit 
9. See Horngren (1981) pp 94-95. 
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maximising pricing as not generally apPlicable 10 . The empirical evidence 
is that cost-plus pricing is the most widespread approach in practice 11 . 
Even the AICPA has departed from its position where it gave prominence to a 
marginalist approach (1965) and now (1985) it has issued a publication for 
aiding member accountants in assisting clients in determining prices which 
is completely based on a cost-plus approach 12 . 
Why is it that this cost plus approach receives such acceptance by managers 
and practising accountants and accounting authors? 
1.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ACCOUNTANT'S DECISION 
At this stage it is useful to review some vital aspects of the discussion 
so fa r. From our analysis of the accountant's "firm" and from the major 
schools of thought in microeconomic theory. there is strong evidence that 
we should expect that the following will have an effect on the perceptions 
and behaviour of the accountant when involved in the pricing decision: 
(1) The practising accountant has a contractual obligation to assist 
in solving a specific problem for a real firm. He has to 
furnish information which will be acted upon. 
(2) "Satisficing as opposed to maximising appears to be a verifiable 
trait of human behaviour".13 
10 . See page 2 of this chapter. 
11. See Dollery (1982). 
12. See AICPA (1985). 
13. As quoted by Thompson (1981: 302) when citing to March and Simon 
( 1958: 140-141). 
( 3) 
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The modern corporation's ownership is 
from control, leading to scope for goal 
increasingly separated 
incongruence and the 
managerial school's claim that managers attempt to maximise 
functions other than shareholders' profit. 
(4) As explained by Leibenstein (1978) "inputs can be used with 
various degrees of efficiency within the firm" (17) and agents 
especially, are likely to have different interests and effort 
levels from pr incipals. 
Conscious of (1) above, that is, that the accountant has to solve a 
specific problem fo r a real firm, I once described the accountant in a 
joint article (Jackson and Dollery, 1984) as "less concerned with 
perfection and more urgently seeking a workable and effective solution " 
(683). I 
(2), (3) 
now feel that accounting theor ists need be heedful of factors 
and (4) above in analysing how the accountant comes to be less 
concerned with perfection in his more urgent search for a "workable" 
pricing so lu t ion. 
Noting the separation of ownership from management and the growth in size 
of the modern corporation, and referring to a study by Tricker (1979) who 
formed the Corporate Policy Group in the United Kingdom to promote a 
greater understanding of corporate direction, control and governance, 
Savage (1984) commented that "the problem today, however, is that corporate 
practice is so diverse that it has outgrown the legal model. Successive 
Company Acts perpetuate the fiction that the shareholders control a company 
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at the annual general meeting, when in reality they are in a weak position 
in re lati on to management" (322). Emphasising this as a problem, Savage 
further observed that Tricker (1979) argued that the large public companies 
with external public investment require "a governing body capable of 
exercising professional supervision over executive actions and demonstra-
ting the legitimacy of corporate activities to outside interests" (Savage: 
322) . 
The pricing decision, with its pivotal affect on volume, cost and profit, 
is possibly t he most important decision of the company. 
Now this study submits that it deserves consideration that t he chartered 
accountant/certified public accountant has a unique tradition of being 
appointed by shareholders to work with , but independently of, management 
with a view to reporting on the custodianship and efficiency of management 
in the interests of shareholders and other parties associated with the 
corporation. It is submitted that he is thus in a unique position to 
perform the task of ensuring that the corporation uses a decision making 
process for pricing which is in accordance with the agreed objectives of 
the organisation. 
Mindful of Leibenstein's caveat that we should view decision making itself 
as an effortful activity and that we could expect different effort levels 
and interests on the part of agents and principals, it becomes even more 
evident that the profit maximising pricing model's rejection must be 
questioned in order to determine whether it is being rejected when it may 
be more efficient for principals (shareholders) and even for managers 
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themselves and other constituencies of the firm.14 
Thus this study proposes that the reasons given by managerial accounting 
authors for regarding the profit maximising pricing mode l as not generally 
applicable should be ex ami ned carefully. 
1.6 THE REASONS CITED FOR THE EXCLUSION OF THE PROFIT MAXIMISING PRICING 
DEC ISION MOD EL 
The reasons generally given by managerial account ing authors for regarding 
the profit maximising pricing model as not being generally applicable in 
practice can be classified as follows: 
(i) the fact that estimations are required for its use; 
(ii) the assertion that, in any case, its use would be severely limited 
to on ly certain types of market structures; 
(iii) the assertion that the maximisation of profit may not be a major 
obj ect i ve of the fi rm; and 
(iv) the fact that price is just one element of the marketing mix. 
Since the examinat ion of the validity of these criticisms of the model is 
of core importance to this study, Garrison's (1985) outline of these 
criticisms is reproduced in full as fol lows: 
"Although the models in Exhibits 12-1 and 12-2 (Figures 1 and 
14. Chapter 5 will examine the conflicting interests of the different 
constituencies of the firm. 
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215 ) do a good job of showing t he genera l outlines of the 
incremental profit approach to pricing, they must be viewed as 
being only broad, conceptual guides in pricing decisions. 
There are several reasons why. First, the cost and revenue 
da ta ava ilable to managers are generally sufficient to provide 
only rough approximations of the shape of the various cost and 
revenue curves depicted in the models. As our methods of 
measurement are improved and refined in years to come, this 
situat ion may change, but at present managers usua lly have only 
a general idea of the shape of the demand curve that they are 
facing. 
Second, the models are directly applicable only in cond it ions 
of monopoly (no directly competing product in the market) and 
monopolistic competition (many se llers of similar products, 
with no one seller having a large enough share of the market 
for other sellers to be able to discern the effect of its 
pricing decision on their sales). The models are not 
applicable between these two extremes, where the market is 
characterised by situations of oligopoly (a few large sellers 
competing directly with one another). The reason is that the 
model s make no allowance for retaliatory pricing decisions by 
competing firms, and retaliatory pricing is a prime character-
istic of oligopolistic industries. 
A third limitation of the general models arises from the fact 
15. See page 10. 
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that price is just one element in the marketing of a product. 
Many other factors must also be considered that can have a 
significant impact on the number of units of a product that can 
be sold at a given price. Among these factors are promotional 
strategy, product design, intensity of selling effort, and the 
selection of distribution channels. 
A final limitation of the general models is that even if 
business firms had a precise knowledge of the shape of their 
demand curves, we cannot automatically assume that they would 
price in such a way as to maximise profits. The reason is that 
this might bring accusations from the public of 'profiteering' 
and 'charging all that the traffic will bear'. Rather than 
attempting to maximise profits, many firms seek only to earn a 
"satisfactory" profit for the company . They think in terms of 
a reasonable return on the investment that has been made in the 
company, and they strive to set prices in such a way as to earn 
that return. The concept of a satisfactory profit underlies 
the actions of a great many business firms today" (503). 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
It is important for the purposes of this study that we recognise that the 
different understandings of firm adopted by the different approaches to the 
study of it, are not mutually exclusive. Machlup (1967) illustrated that 
depending on the purpose in mind, different concepts of the firm are 
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useful. 16 He included in his illustration, inter alia, a managerial 
science concept of the firm for the purpose of that discipline and a theory 
of competitive prices and allocation concept of the firm for the purpose of 
the neoclassical economist. He then urged: 
"I hope there wi 11 be no argument about wh i ch concept of the 
fi rm is the most important or the most usefu 1. Si nc e they 
serve different purposes, such an argument would be 
pOintless" (28). 
It is useful to read this together with the NAA'S (Gordon, et al: 1981) 
comment: 
"Pricing decisions utilise the ta lent s and know-how of many 
individuals across several functional areas, of which 
accounting is only one. Management accountants must be 
willing and able to work with individuals from various 
disciplines if their rea l potentia l for aiding executives in 
making pricing decisions is to be achieved" (11). 
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, most economic science studies 
today defending the neoclassical theory of the firm are positivist 
studies 17 . This study will be a normative defence of the profit 
maximising pricing model. It is submitted that if the profit max imising 
16. Machlup 
contest 
the two 
( 1967 : 
between 
had come 
29) went as far as to say that "instead of a heated 
marginalism and managerialism ... a marriage between 
about" . 
17. See page 3 of this chapter. 
26 
pricing model is excluded for the wrong reasons, this could be a manifes-
tation of X-inefficiency. 
Encouraged by the quotation from Machlup (1967: 28) above, and the NAA's 
recognition of the interdisciplinary nature of the pricing decision, this 
study will accept the findings of t he behavioural and managerial schools 
and x-inefficiency theory in the sense that they explain influences acting 
upon the pricing decision maker. Look ing at pricing from the unique 
perspective of the accountant, who has a heritage of independent 
examination of the financial affairs of a company in the interests of 
shareholders, third parties, managers and the firm as a whole, 
the present study wil l critically question the reasons given by managerial 
accounting authors for the widespread exclusion of the application of the 
profit maxim ising pricing model. 
The study will use the empirical data of two major pricing behaviour 
studies; namely, Dollery (1983), a South African study, and Gordon et al 
(1981), an American study commissioned by the National Association of 
Accountants. 
The remainder of this study will be organised as follows: 
(i) Chapter 2 will examine the argument that the model's use is severely 
limited in that it could only be applied in certain types of market 
structures. 
(ii) Chapter 3 will examine the argument levelled against the profit 
27 
maximising pricing model on the grounds that the model is only as 
good as the estimates it embodies. 
(iii) Chapter 4 will examine the argument that the model excludes the non-
price elements of the marketing mix. 
(iv) Chapter 5 will examine the argument levelled against the model on 
the grounds that profit maximisation may not be the sole or major 
objective of the firm. 
(v) Chapter 6 will conclude as to the findings of the study and the 
policy proposals which can be deduced therefrom. 
It must be stressed that it is not the philosophy of profit maximisation, 
but the profit maximising decision model which is being defended. 
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CHAPTER II: THE MARKET STRUCTURE ARGUMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A standard argument levelled against the profit maximising pricing model in 
favour of cost-plus pricing is the a l legation that i t is "only,,1 
applicable under conditions of monopoly and monpolistic competition. 
Garrison 's (1985) statement of the argument reads as follows: 
"Second, the models are directly applicable only in conditions of 
monopoly (no directly competing product in the market) and 
monopolistic competition (many sellers of s imilar products, with 
no one seller having a large enough share of the market for other 
sellers to be able to discern the effect of its pricing decision 
on their sales). The models are not applicable between these two 
extremes, where the market is characterised by situations of 
oligopoly (a few large sellers competing directly with one 
another) . The reason is that the models make no a llowance for 
retaliatory pricing decisions by competing firms, and retaliatory 
1. In a wide ranging study of concentration of manufacturing industry i n 
-South Africa, Du Plessis (1977) did extensive work on the categori-
zation of concentration of industry with the national Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) figures. Dollery (1983) used this work 
to define the populations for his samples. It is interesting to note 
that Dollery's monopolistic competition population included as many as 
7 409 South African manufacturing firms which could be thought of as 
approximating workable competition or at least monopolistic 
competition and 1 175 Sout h African manufacturing firms which may be 
taken to approximate monopolistic markets. See Dollery (1983) p 136 
and p 188. 
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pr icing is a prime characteristic of oligopolistic industries" 
(503) . 
This chapter will examine the validity of this argument which is used to 
support the widespread exclusion of the model . 
The modus operandi begins with a theoretical analysis which will il lustrate 
scope for the application of the profit maximising pricing model in each of 
the four market structures, showing how the model can be used to maximise 
profit in each of these market structures. Thereafter, the empirical 
evidence of two major studies (Gordon et aI, 1981 ; and Dollery, 1983) of 
the pricing behaviour of manufacturers will be examined for supporting 
evidence of the contention that there is a place for the profit maximising 
pricing model in all four market structures. 
2.2 PERFECT COMPETITION 
It is widely accepted that the existence of four main features 
distinguishes the perfectly competitive market; namely 
(i) The products of the firms in the industry are homogenous; 
(i i) No ne of the buyers or sellers in the market are of significant 
enough size to affect the gOing market price of the product; 
(iii) Resource inputs are completely mobile so that there are no restric-
tions on the freedom of firms entering or leaving the industry ; and 
(iv) There is perfect information so that buyers and sellers make 
decisions under conditions of certainty. 
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The possible arguments against the profit maximising pricing model on the 
grounds of this market structure per se must be identified and examined. 
There are two arguments: 
(1) A perfectly competitive market does not exist. 
(2) Assuming that such a market does exist, the price of products offered 
for sa Ie is given so that there is no use for the mode I. 
The first argument, namely, that a perfectly compet i tive market does not 
exist, is not a valid argument agai nst profit maximising pricing in favour 
of cost-plus pricing at all. At most it just means that this market 
structure need not be considered in the argument. In no sense can it be 
argued that cost-plus pricing is more applicable in non-existent markets 
than profit maximising pricing. Further, of the total population of firms, 
the fact that none of them are perfectly competitive does not mean that the 
population size of firms under considerat ion for either pr icing model is 
reduced. All firms must now fall into one of, or a mix of, the other 
market structures which wi II be examined. In f act, since proponents of 
cost-p lus pricing argue that there is no scope for the profit maximising 
model under perfect competition on another ground, the non existence of 
this market structure would actually be in favour of the profit maximising 
pricing model because this exclusion would increase the number of firms 
under monopolistic competition where the model is said to be more 
applicable. 
Clearly, in practice, infinite gradations in the dilution of these features 
of perfect competition, until their total absence, will character ise the 
markets in which products are produced and sold. Further, no market in the 
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real world will ever meet all four of these stringent characteristics of 
perfect competition. As seen in chapter one of the present study, 
neoclassical microeconomic theory, led by such eminent writers as Machlup 
(1967), Friedman (1962; 1952) and Stigler (1957), for example, has copious 
literature debating the usefulness of the theoretical construct of the 
perfectly competitive firm, explaining how a model may yield valid 
conclusions in spite of embodying unrealistic assumptions. Thus a study of 
the perfectly competitive model may be argued to be useful for our purposes 
for the many firms operating under condit ions very close to the condit ions 
of perfect competition. This view is summed up well by Thompson (1981) 
when he states" as we shall see, the perfectly competi ti ve model captures 
the essence of real-world markets where large numbers of relatively small 
firms se ll identical products" (321). In essence, the argument in the 
context of this study can be said to be that the perfectly competitive 
model is of practical value for the market structure under which many 
sellers possess no monopoly power over price. Scherer (1980) put it 
succinctly as follows: 
"Homogeneity of the product and insignificant size of individual sellers 
(i.e. ATOMISTIC market structure) are suff icient conditions for the 
existence of pure competition - the only basic structural type under 
which sellers possess no mcnpoly power" (11). 
Clark (1940) initiated the notion of "workable competition", the essence of 
which lies in the "rivalry in selling gOods,,2 (243). 
2. This notion has been developed by, inter alia, Bain (1959) and Markham 
(1950). 
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The second argument. namely. that there is no use for the model when price 
is given. ignores the fact that the model also indicates the level of 
output which will maximise profit. 
From both Figures 2.1 and 2.2. it can be seen that the firm must produce a 
quantity of 01 units of output in order to maximise profits. 
Figure 2.1 
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Thus the profit maximising pricing model is applicable in perfect 
competition for the maximisation of the firm's prof it in that it can 
indi cate the optimum volume of output for the firm. 
2.3 MONOPOLY AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
2.3. 1 MONOPOLY 
As with perfect competit ion, the existence of a real wor ld counterpart of 
the opposite extreme of perfect competitio n is similarly doubted by 
economists. 3 The attribute of there being a sole supp lier of a product is 
frequently met but the absence of close substitutes is more difficult to 
find. Thompson (1981) extracts the essence of the usefulness of this 
theoretical const ruct when he says that the examination of the price and 
output decisions of the pure monopolist is of value because it "illuminates 
the patterns of monopolistic behaviour, irrespective of whether a firm is a 
pure monopo li st" (439). Here the firm's demand/average revenue curve is 
the same as the industry's demand curve. Since opponents of the profit 
maximising model do not deny its applicability in a monopoly on the grounds 
of market structure4, it is not necessary to examine this market structure 
in any further detail, other than to mention that the model will be applied 
to set price and volume in the manner il lustrated in chapter 
study.5 
of this 
3. See, for example, Stigler (1966) and Kirzne r (1973) and Trifin (1940). 
4. See Garrison (1985: 503). 
5. See chapter 1, page 10 . 
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2.3.2 Monopolistic Competition 
Turning our attention to monopolistic competition, we note that the sellers 
in this type of market, which is characterised by the existence of large 
numbers of sellers and some degree of product differentiation, still face 
competition from many rivals who differentiate between basically homogenous 
products to create t heir own particular version in order to create a kind 
of limited monopoly. The crux of the matter for the purposes of this study 
is that this differentiation gives the seller some degree of price 
discretion. "The distinguishing trait of a differentiated product is the 
ability of the seller to raise the product's price without sacrificing the 
entire sales volume" (Scherer, 1980: 11). 
Once again, since the opponents of the profit maximising pricing model do 
not exclude the model on the grounds of this market structure, it is not 
necessary to illustrate the application of the model in monopolistic 
competition where it will also be applied in the manner illustrated in 
chapter 1 of this study. 
2.4 OLIGOPOLY 
2.4.1 BACKGROUND 
When 
total 
a small number of firms supply the dominant share of an industry's 
output the market is said to be oligopolistic. The behaviour of 
these few producers is characterised by a strong perception of t heir inter-
dependence in that their actions have significant repercussions on rival 
firms. The effect of these dynamics is that the behaviour of real world 
36 
oligopolistic firms is not characterised by one norm. 
This makes oligopoly a part icularly complex and difficult subject . Scherer 
(1980) has commented that oligopoly is interesting not only because of its 
prevalence but "because it poses such difficul t prob lems for the economic 
theorist" (151). Dollery (1983) commented that "some of the most 
distinguished theorists in economic science have met their metaphorical 
fates in this complex area of conjecture" (27). 
It is not surprising then that the accounting literature , with its "more 
urgent" search for "workable solutions,,6 has taken its simplification of 
microeconomic theory to its most extreme in this area of its adoption of 
pricing theory. 
Mirroring the wide variety of different competitive circumstances which 
exist in oligopoly, "economists have developed literally dozens of 
oligopoly theories" (Scherer, 1980: 151) . 
Accounting theorists, noticing the increased price inter-dependency under 
this market form, have focussed on a model for one structure of oligopo-
listic competition and ignored the other dozens of models for the other 
structures of oligopolistic competition. Based on this false 
generalisation they have fallaciously held that there is no place for the 
application of the profit maximising pricing model in t he whole of 
oligopoly. As quoted on page 28 of this study, Garrison (1985) states 
6. See page 20 of this study . 
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that "the (profit maximising pricing) models are not applicable between 
these two extremes (monopoly and monopolistic competition) where the 
market is characterised by oligopoly" (503). 
This is quite simply false. This conclusion which has its origin in 
oversimplification and fallacious generalisation is incorrect on at least 
two counts. 
Firstly, it assumes that the profit maximis ing pricing model only assists 
in maximising prof its by setting price. This is incorrect. It has already 
been shown, when analysing perfect competition in this chapter, that, even 
when there is no price discretion, the model assists in profit maximisation 
by indicating the volume of production which will maximise profit. In the 
same manner, those oligopolists who are price takers, can use their 
estimated demand and cost curves to set the volume which will max imise 
their profits. 
Secondly, not all oligopolists are price takers. It will be shown in this 
chapter that under some structures of oligopolistic competition, some of 
the oligopolists do have some degree of price discretion which indeed gives 
the firm potential to maximise profits by the use of cost-volume-profit 
analysis. 
2.4.2 THE KINKED DEMAND CURVE 
Since account ing theorists allege that all 
hamstrung into being pricetakers, let us 
oligopolists are perforce 
first examine a model of 
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oligopolistic competition under which all the firms are locked into a 
pricetaker's Position.? 
Pioneered by Sweezy (1939), the kinked demand curve model illustrates how a 
few firms supplying a market could have to refrain from independently 
changing their price. 
Assume that firms A, Band C sell a product at price P1 as in Figure Z.3 
and A's quantity sold is Q1' If A lowers its price to Pz and t his price 
reduction is ignored by Band C, clearly A's share of the market should 
increase and its quantity sold would increase greatly, to say QZ' However, 
if Band C match A's new price, A would maintain its share of the market 
and its volume would not increase all t he way to Q2' because the whole 
industry would be selling at a lower price and therefore it would only 
experience an increase in volume to, say, Q3' in proportion to what the 
whole industry's volume increased as a result of the lower pri ce. 
Similarly, if A raises its price to P3 and this price increa se is ignored 
by Band C, A's market share will fall and its volume sold will fall 
? It must be stressed that, given the plethora of oligopolistic models, a 
comprehensive survey of all the models is quite impossi ble. The object 
of this section is simply to show that there are oligopolist market 
structures under which there is scope for the maximising model . 
Consequently we will only look at one model, the so-cal led Kinked 
Demand Curve model, under which all the competitiors are price takers, 
and a few models under which some of the competitors are price makers. 
(The kinked demand curve represents the structure under which the least 
pr ice discretion would be expected.) The set out of the graphic 
illustrations in this chapter is based on Scherer (1980) and Thompson 
(1981) and Sher and Pinola (1981). 
39 
greatly, to say 04. However, if Band C follow A's price increase, then A 
will maintain its old share of the market and its volume sold would only 
decrease in proportion to what the whole industry's volume would fall, to 
say 05' as a result of the industry selling at a higher price. 
Thus if rivals match A's price reductions but do not match price increases 
then A's demand curve would be kinked at point P1 01 as illustrated in 
figure 2.3. 
Thus in this situation, A, Band C can expect that price cuts may be 
mat ched by rivals in order that they do not lose market share and that 
price increases may not be followed by rivals in order that they may 
increase their market share. Therefore, the price can be expected to stick 
at P1 and this has led accounting theorists, in their oversimplication, to 
allege that all oligopolists will always be price takers and that the 
profit maximising pricing model will not be applicable for maximising 
profits. 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the error made by managerial accounting 
authors when they allege that the profit maximising model is not applicable 
to oligopolists because they are price takers. 
Assume the usual marginal cost function and assume that an oligopolist has 
a kinked demand curve as was postulated in figure 2.3 and assume a marginal 
cost function MC 1 and a current price of Pl. 
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It has been seen in chapter one of this study that profits are maximised 
when marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
The profit maximising pricing model indicates that profit will be maximised 
by this firm if it produces 01 units for sale. Further, figure 2.4 shows 
that even if input costs rise, profits wi ll be maximised at quantity 01 
right up to a cost function increase pushing the marginal cost function 
all the way to Me3. 
Figure 2.5 shows even more scope for the profit maximising pricing model t o 
assist in maximising the firm's profit by showing that the model indicates 
the profit maximising output level where demand for an oligopolist's 
product increases whilst he is faced with a price taker's kinked demand 
curve. 
As t he demand function shifts from 01 to 02' the marginal revenue function 
shifts from MR1 to MR2. 
The profit maximising pricing model indicates that although price should 
not change as a result of this increase in demand , the quantity produced 
for sale by the firm should increase from 01 to 02 in order to maximise 
profits. 
Thus, even when an oligopolist is locked into a price taking position the 
profit maximising model will aid in maximising profits. 
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2.4.3 PRICE MAKERS 
We now turn our attention to illustrat i ng that there are conditions under 
which some oligopolists do have price discretion and can use the profit 
max imising pr i cing model in order to set the price at wh ich they wil l 
maximise profits. 
2.4.3.1 EQUAL MARKET SHARES AND EQUAL COSTS 
The first structure with this potential, is, grantedly, a special case, 
namely, the special case in which two firms have equal market shares and 
equal costs and supp ly the whole market. Each oligopolist then serves ha lf 
of the demand and the two firms will have i dentical demand, marg i nal 
revenue, margina l cost, total revenue and total cost functions. Sett ing 
the price where marginal revenue equals marginal cost will maximise profit 
for each of the firms. No price conflict exists . 
It must be stressed that not only will there not be incentive for rivalry 
at this profit maximising price, but this study submi ts that the estimat ion 
of the cost and revenue curves, required by the profit maxi mising mode l , 
wi l l help avoid rivalrous pr ice behaviour by guiding each duopolist to the 
price which is the mutually optimum price for them. 
2.4.3.2 EQUAL MARKET SHARES DIFFEREN T COSTS 
Assume that Firm 1 and Firm 2 have equal market shares and that they supply 
the whole market, but they have different cost functions. 
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Figure 2.6 shows that Firm 1 will maximise profits at price P1 whereas Firm 
2 will maximise profits at price P2. Homogeneity of product ensures that 
competitive forces will drive t he two firms to sell at the same price. 
One possibility is that t he f irms strike a compromise price via collusion. 
However, apart from the fact t hat most countries have legislated against 
such collusion, it is a "fragile means of reaching a long-lasting solution" 
(Thompson 1981: 389). The very fact that it is a compromise creates the 
incentive to breach the collusion. 
Thus an alternative is for Firm 1 to exercise its advantage of having a 
preference for the lower price, P1, to sell at P1 and thus impose its will 
on Firm 2 in the likelihood that Firm 2 will have to follow suit and sell 
at price P1 in order to maintain its market share. 
It could happen that Firm 2 would rather enter into a price war and even 
sell below price P1 in order to discourage Firm 1 from selling at price P1. 
However , it is frequently ignored by theorists that such a price war would 
be fought at a price which is even further away from Firm 2's optimum price 
than Firm 1's. 
It could also happen that Firm 2 maintains its price at P2 and loses a 
portion of its market share. This could have t he effect of allocating an 
increased volume of sales to Firm 1, beyond its profit maximising 
volume of Q1. However, considering the other variables in the marketing 
o 
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mix8 effecting volume of sales such as advertising effort, for example, 
there is a strong possibi lity that this would not be a vital factor. 
Thus, of the various possib le responses by the firm with the higher cost 
function, Thompson (1981) concludes that short of shifting to another 
business, it is likely that two options will prove to be the most viable 
for it , namely: 
(1) "revamping its production techniques to br i ng costs in l i ne with (or 
even lower than) those of rival firms"; and 
(2) "doing the best it ca n at the price chosen by the low cost firms" 
(390) . 
Thus it is clear that in such an oligopolistic structure, there can be a 
price maker and the profit maximising pricing model would help to indicate 
the price and quantity which would maximise profits for the price maker. 
2.4 .3.3 DIFFERENT MARKET SHARES AND EQUAL COSTS 
When firms have equal marginal cost functions (note it is not required here 
that fixed and total cost functions are equal) but different shares of the 
market at the same prices, three different patterns of marginal cost 
behaviour can be distinguished. Over the relevant range of production, 
marginal costs could be rising or constant or decreasing, as in Figures 
2.7a, 2.7b and 2.7c respectively. Assume that at the same prices, Firm 1 
8. The significance of other variables of the marketing mix will be 
examined more closely in Chapter 4. 
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supplies 40 per cent of the market and Firm Z supplies 60% of the market. 
Figure Z. 7a shows that when marginal costs are rising as volume increases, 
the firm with the smallest market share maximises profit at the lower 
price, P1, whereas, Firm Z maximises profit at the higher pr ice , PZ' The 
smaller firm may exercise its advantage of having a preference for t he 
lower price. Again, the other firm, preferring the higher price, wi ll have 
the same options as in the previous example. Here, the firm preferring the 
higher price is bigger than t he one preferring the lower price and it may 
be in a better position to conduct a punitive price war to coerce the 
smaller firm into charging a higher price. Thus, i n th is case, the 
likelihood of the smaller fir m being able to be a price maker imposing its 
price on the market is smaller, but not unheard of. Smaller-share firms 
are sometimes financially strong enough , due to, for example, good 
liquidity, or strong parent companies, to withstand pressure from larger-
share firms. 
Figure Z.7b shows that when marginal costs are constant over the relevant 
range both the larger-share and smaller-share firms maximise profits at t he 
same price. This is inconsistent with the standard managerial accounting 
literature, which hol ds that there is no place for the price setting profit 
maximi sing model in an oligopolistic market structure . Furthermore, this 
is especially significant when the prevalence of this non-conflict case is 
taken into account. Explaining the prevalence of this case, when pricing 
is oriented towards long run goals , Scherer (1980) cited the degrees of 
multi-plant operation over the long run to explain the constant marginal 
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costs phenomenon. He went as far as to say "this suggests the prevalence 
of the no conflict case (figure 2.7b) (constant marginal costs) when 
pricing is oriented toward long-run goals" (158). He feels that short run 
marginal cost curves would more likely be in the nature of the increasing 
marginal cost case as ill ustrated in figure 2.7a. 
In similar vein. Thompson (1981: 392) ci tes three causes to explain the 
prevalence of the constant marginal cost curve. Firstly. he pOints out 
that cost studies of manufacturing enterprises have shown a fairly 
widespread tendency for constant returns to variable input up to 85% to 90% 
of capacity.9 Secondly. he also refers to the argument that constant 
returns to sca le may prevail as output expands over the long run. Thirdly. 
he asserts that competition forces rival firms to remain cost competitive. 
Considering these three factors Thompson concludes "the lack of a sizable 
differential amongst respective profit maximising prices of rival firms (as 
shown in figure 2.7b) may not be uncommon" (392). 
Thus the opportunity afforded for the application of the profit maximising 
pricing model under oligopolistic competition is a significant 
contradiction of the manageria l accounting theory whic h holds that there is 
no place for the model in oligopoly. 
Figure 2. 7c shows that when marginal cost declines over the relevant range 
9. See Thompson (1981: 280) and see p 279 where he refers to an empirical 
study of the metal industry by Alpert (1959) which found constant 
returns to scale and horizontal long run average cost curve (LRAC) 
after a threshold output level. 
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of production the firm with the largest market share prefers the lower 
pri ceo 10 The smaller firm is less likely to be able to wage a punitive 
price war against the bigger one, and it is therefore likely that the 
larger firm will exercise its advantage in maximising profits at the lower 
pri ce . When it is considered that this pr ice, being the lower one, 
would also be better for discouraging entry of other firms into the market, 
then the likelihood of the larger firm exercising its preference for its 
lower profit maximising price must be seen to be even greater. Thus, here 
again, is sign ificant scope for the application of the profit maximising 
pricing model for the purpose of price setting under oligopolistic 
competi tio n. 
2.4.3 . 4 DOMINANT FIRM PRICE LEADERSHIP 
When one firm, often a highly vertically integrated one, accounts for a 
much larger share of the market than any of its rivals, which are often a 
number of fringe competitors, then it sometimes happens that one way i n 
which the f irms arrive at a common price is for the large firm to take the 
initiative to act as a price leader for the industry.11 When this occurs 
the other firms wait for the leader to announce a price change which is 
accepted and followed by the other firms. 12 
10. Thompson (1981: 279) quotes a number of studies e.g. Moore (1959) and 
Lomax (1951) and Johnston (1960) showing empirical evidence of LRAC 
declining as output rises. 
11. Thompson (1981: 739) cites the American firms of K Mart, A & D and 
Sears as good examples of dominant f irm price leadership. 
12. Also, the market sometimes does not have a 
and in what is known as barometric pricing, 
the price leading role. 
clear, long term leader, 
bigger firms alternate in 
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The dominant firm sets its price and output per the usual profit maximising 
pricing model. The other firms supply the rest of the market at the set 
price. The fringe firms therefore behave just as firms in a perfectly 
competitive market, there being scope for the use of the profit maximising 
pricing model for the determination of the quantity only, at which they 
will maximise profits. Although this proves that there is scope for the 
dominant firm to set its profit maximising price in this market structure, 
it must be noted that the prevalence of this price will not be as 
widespread as may appear . The reason is that if the larger firm prefers a 
higher price it means that smaller firms have an advantage and the current 
smaller ones may grow large and powerful at this higher price and other 
smaller firms would be attracted into the market at such a higher 
price. However, the pOint is that this phenomenon of dominant firm price 
leadership is further evidence of scope for the profit maximising pricing 
model in setting prices in oligopolistic situations. 
Having shown that oligopolistic market structures do not per se exclude the 
use of the profit maximising pricing model, let us turn our attention to 
two research studies of practical pricing behaviour in manufacturing firms. 
2.5 RESEARCH STUDIES OF PRICING BEHAVIOUR IN MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
2.5.1 The American and Canadian Study 
In 1981 the National Association of Accountants of the United States of 
America released its research study (Gordon et aI, 1981) on pricing 
behaviour in the United States and Canada. The primary objective of this 
study wa s "to determi ne how manufactur i ng fi rms in th e Uni ted States and 
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Canada are presently making pricing decisions". (1) 
Of particular interest were the questions posed to determine inter alia, 
"the relationship between pricing and economic market structure". (1) 
The samp le consisted of 44 firms, the products of which were being sold in 
primarily two different economic market structures, namely monopolistic 
competition and oligopoly. 
According to the literature, non-price competition is more important than 
competition on the basis of price to oligopolistic competitors. Thompson 
(1981) states that in an oligopoly "the most attractive strategies for 
gaining sales, profit and market share are thus grounded in market 
variab les other than price". 
The respondents were asked to rate the intensity (based on a scale of 1 to 
5, ranging from low to extreme) of various types of competition they faced. 
Appendix 1(b), shows the high intensity of price competition throughout. 
Note, for instance, that the food processing industry firms studied in the 
United States were mainly operating under monopolistic competition whereas 
th e heavy equipment firms studied in the United States were all operating 
under oligopolistic compet it io n. 13 Yet both categories rated the intensity 
of price competition as high. In fact, the firms in the heavy equipment 
sector in the United States, wh ich were mainly oligopolistic, ranked the 
13. See appendix 1(a) on page 65. 
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intensity of price compet i tion as even higher than the United States food 
processing firms (operating mainly under monopol isti c compet i tion) ranked 
it. The study concluded: "These results indicated that the firms included 
in our study did indeed view pricing decisions as a key item in ~heir 
product line's survival" (Gordon et aI, 1981: 40). 
The respondents were also asked to indicate whether their price s were 
determined on the basis of product costs and/or market factors. An 
overwhelming 40 of the 44 firms cons idered both market conditions and costs 
in determining pr ices. This is especially significant when it is 
cons idered that the profit maximising pricing model, with its required 
estimations of both revenues and costs at different prices, is a model 
which requires specific consideration of both costs and market conditions. 
This major National Association of Accountants study found that its efforts 
at explaining pricing decisions based on di ffere nces between economic 
market structures were unproductive. It reported that because the 
products under study were being sold in different market structures they 
investigated "whether differences in priCing objectives, policies and 
decisions could be explained on the basis of economic markets" (41). 
However, it concluded: "This investigation (which was based on various 
forms of statistical analyses) was unproductive" (41). 
On the other hand significant correlations between other factors (i.e. 
other than market structure) and pricing practices were found. 
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Appendices 1(c) and 1(d) show factors which were mo re easily correlated 
than market structure to the incidence of cost-plus pricing versus market 
related pricing. 
With statistically significant relationships at the 10% or lower level, it 
was found that companies which produced standard products tended to be more 
prone towards market pricing than companies which produced custom made 
products. 
Clearly, in the United States and Canada, the reaction of government 
agencies to product line pri ces appears to have a significant effect on 
pricing practi ces: "where the government was perceived as playing a 
reactive role to the firm 's pricing decisions cost-plus pricing occupied a 
dominant role. In those firms where the government was perceived as being 
less reactive to prices, pricing based on market conditions dominated" 
(Gordon et aI, 1981: 24). 
Appendix 1 (d) shows pricing based on market conditions is also 
significantly correlated with the importance attached to the price of 
directly and near directly competing substitutes and to the importance 
attached to the quality of competing products. 14 
Commenting on the significant positive correlation between pricing based on 
market conditions and the importance attached to the company's level of 
14. Ma ny other important factors were found correlating significantly 
with the incidence of either cost-plus or market related pricing; 
especially concerning the purpose of pricing. 
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employment and the company's image, this study stated: "These findings 
were expected in that image and employment issues can be more directly 
affected by market pricing than by cost-plus pricing" (25) .15 
Thus it would appear that in America and Canada the empirical evidence of 
pricing practices supports the conclusion of the theoretical analysis of 
this chapter of this study which found scope for pricing decisions in all 
market structures including oligopoly. Indeed factors other than market 
structure were more strongly correlated with pricing practices. 
2.5.2 A South African Study 
The findings of a study of pricing behaviour in the South African 
manufacturing industry can now be examined. Dollery (1983) categorised the 
288 firms which participated in the study as being in market structures 
which are either highly concentrated "and may be taken to approximate 
monopolistic markets" (188) or medium concentrated "and may be considered 
to approximate the oligopolistic market form" (188) or lowly concentrated 
"and may be thought of as approximating workable competition or at least 
monopol istic competition" (188). 
Considering the importance of target return on investment as a method of 
cost-plus pricing, and the importance of profit maximisation as a goal to 
neoclassical theory, it is pertinent to our study that in studying the 
15. This will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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Blair target return on investment mode l 16 , Dollery (1983) asked the firms 
to rank a number of possible goa ls in importance to their pricing policy. 
It must be stressed here that profit maximisation does not have to be the 
main or only goal (it just has to be an important goal) for the pro fi t 
maximising pr icing mode l to be a useful tool in the maximisation of a 
firm's resources. 17 
Appendix 2(i) shows that there was a correlation between market structure 18 
and t he ranking of an acceptable rate of return as the primary objective of 
pricing policy. 68 per cent of firms in themonopolistic market structure 
and 66,3 per cent of firms in the oligopolistic market structure ranked 
th is goal foremost but only 41,6 per cent of firms in monopolistic 
competition ranked it foremost. 
However, when testing whether there was any significant relationsh ip 
between type of market structure and the manifestation of this goal in 
actual pricing behaviour, in the form of evidence of the a priori expected 
behaviour traits of the target return hypothesis, no significant 
correlation was found. When considering firms which experience r i sing unit 
costs when volume of production falls, the Blair return on investment mode l 
16. See Blai r (1972: ch 18). 
17. Chapter 5 will study t he integration of a number of goals into the 
profit maximising pricing model approach to pricing decision making . 
18. In appendix 2(i) the categorisations of low, medium and high refer to 
the degrees of concentration described above. 
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predicts that the monopolistic and oligopolistic firms will raise 
prices in order to maintain their target rate of return. Conversely, 
thei r 
the 
model predicts that competitive firms will be forced to either reduce their 
prices or to keep them constant. 
However, on investigation, Dollery (1983) concluded that they were "forced 
to accept the null hypothesis" (208) and no significant correlation was 
found between market structure and this price behaviour". 
Similarly , if the target return on investment model hypothesis, which was 
ranked as being of differing importance in different structures, was being 
implemented as ranked, then it would be reasonable to expect firms in 
concentrated industries to pursue a policy of pr ice stability when actual 
production exceeds standard vo lume since they are already achieving their 
target rate of return, and to expect firms operating in a competitive 
environment to increase their prices in such circumstances in the absence 
of economies of scale. However, appendix 2(i i) shows "no significant 
differences in the manner in which all three concentration categories 
responded" (Dollery, 1983 : 210). 
Thus, although market structure appeared to be significant in terms of 
rank ing the target rate of return as a pricing goal in South Africa, 
efforts to find a correlation between market structure and actual practical 
pricing behaviour consistent with the target return on investment goal, 
proved unproductive and the null hypothesis of no correlation had to be 
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accepted. 19 
At this stage it must be pOinted out that the object of this chapter is 
not to prove that there is no correlation between market structure and 
pricing practices. Indeed, the theoretical part of this chapter 
specifically illustrated how an oligopolistic market structure could 
eliminate pricing discretion. However, the theoretical analysis proved 
that oligopoly could produce many different types of competitive structures 
and that some of these do allow for price discretion and the scope for the 
application of the profit maximising pricing model in setting pr ice. Thus, 
even if the importance of the target return on investment goal, which 
showed a correlation with market structure, had also shown a correlation 
between its practical implementat ion and market structure, this would not 
have contradicted the argument in this chapter. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that it was not 100 per cent of oligopolists 
or any competitors among any market structure who ranked the target retu rn 
on investment as their primary pricing goal. Indeed , appendix 2(iii) shows 
that as many as 18,9 per cent of oligopolistic firms ranked obtaining the 
maximum profits possible as the primary goal of their pricing policy. Over 
40 per cent of respondents in the competit ive group ranked profit 
maximisation foremost and over 18 per cent of monopolies. Thus, once 
again, whi 1st a correlation between market structure and the ranking of 
obtaining the maximum profits possible as the primary goal of pricing 
policy was found i n South Africa , the findings still confirmed our own 
19 . See Dollery (1983: 211) 
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theoretical ana lysis which found scope for the profit maximising pricing 
model in all market structures. 
Again, looking at actual pricing practices together with market structure, 
the Dollery (1983) study asked questions concerning the incidence of the 
use of pr icing rules and questions concerning the incidence of the use of 
cost-based versus market-based pricing policies. 
Considering the importance of market structure in traditional priCing 
theory one would expect a positive relationship between market structures 
and the incidence of the application of pricing rules. Appendix 2 (i v) 
shows no significant correlation between market structure and t he 
application of pricing rules: "with the value of chi-square at only 
0,59708 and 2 degrees of freedom th is is clearly not the case; that is, 
the degree of market concentration per se does not shed much light on the 
evidence of pricing rules" (Dollery, 1983: 238). 
Looking at significance of market structure to cost-based versus market-
based pricing and to the use of pricing rules, appendix 2(v) shows a bias 
towards cost based practices in all market structures in South African 
manufacturing industry. However , there is no significant correlation 
between market structure and the use of cost-based or market-based 
practices or the use of pricing rules. "Seen as a two way contingency 
table, the value of chi-square for Table 31 is 7,39820 with 3 degrees of 
freedom which is not significant at the 5 per cent level . We therefore 
accept the null hypothesis of no relationship between the variables" 
(Dollery, 1983: 276). Dollery (1983) in fact, commented: "The influence 
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of the degree of market concentration on the var iables in question i s 
minimal" (276). 
Consistent with the American and Canadian study, i t is noteworthy that the 
majority (77%) of all the South African respondents described th eir pricing 
as being both cost-based and market-based . 20 It is worth reiterating that 
the profit maximising pricing model is a decision model which inherently 
sets price taking costs and market considerations into account. 
The Dollery (1983) study did find a correlation between market structure 
and factors which could influence pricing policies - but not determinately. 
In contrast to the American and Canadian study, a correlation between 
market structure and respondent ' s ranking of the importance of the 
different strategic variable in their marketing policy was found. 42,5% of 
firms in monopo li stic competition ranked pricing as highest in importance, 
whereas 23,4% of firms in oligopolistic market structure ranked pricing 
highest, and 33,3% of monopolies ranked pricing highest in importance. It 
must be pOinted out that even in oligopoly then, 23,4% ranked pricing as 
highest. 
This shows scope for the profit maximising pricing model for some firms in 
oligopoly even if the ranking of pricing in importance in the marketing 
strategy was determinate in the choice and application of a firm's pricing 
practi ce o 
20. See Dollery (1983: 216). 
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A correlation was also found between other factors and market structure, 
such as, the correlation between the importa nce of trade associations to 
pricing and market structure, and the correlation between the speed of 
price adjustments in response to changes in demand and market structure. 21 
However, consistent with the American and Canadian study, all efforts to 
find a correlation between market structure and the actua l app lication of a 
pricing practice were unfruitful. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In sum, it has been shown in this chapter of this study that the profit 
maximising pricing model can be used to determine the profit maximising 
output level in all market structures . Further, the theoretical part of 
this chapter proved the assertion that some competitors in some 
oligopolistic market structures do have pricing discretion and do have 
scope for the use of the profit maximising pricing model in setting prices. 
The examination of the empirical evidence of two major studies supports 
these conc lusions of our theoretical analysis. The Dollery (1983) study 
found some correlations between market structure and some factors which 
could influence pricing policy but not between the actual application of 
pricing practices in t he form of cost-plus versus market related methods 
and market structure. The American and Canadian study went further and 
concluded that trying to explain pricing decisions based on market 
structures proved to be "naive" (Gordon et ai, 1981: 41). This shows that 
the oligopolistic market st ructure does not, per se, exclude the use of the 
profit maximising pricing model as alleged by Garrison (1985)22. 
21. See Dollery (1983: 198). 
22. See Garrison (1985: 503) as quoted on page 28. 
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APPENDIX 1(a) 
Extract from Gordon et al (1981: 41) 
Exhibit showing market structure facing products for the firms 
stud led 
ECONOMIC MARKET STRUcnJRE 
~ Food Ht!:lvy Transportatiun Processing Chemical Equipment Equipment Economic 
Market U.S. Can. U.S. Can. U.S. Can. U.S. Cdn. 
Pure 
Competition 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Monopolistic 
Competition S 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 
Ollaopoly 1 S 6 2 3 S 5 6 
Monopoly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTALS 6 6 8 4 3 6 S 6 
, 
. 
Totals 
U.S. Can. 
1 0 
6 4 
15 18 
0 0 
22 22 
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APPENDIX 1(b) 
Extract from Gordon et al (1981: 42) 
~ustty 
Intensity 
of Competili~ 
po", 
Ptoduct Quality 
Scrvi~ 
Obllinin& the 
Best Channels of 
Distribution 
Product 
Innovation 
Advertisin& an4 
Promotion 
INTENSITY Of PRODUCT LINE COMPETITION 
Food Ptocessin, 
U.S. Can. Total U.S. 
•. 16 3.83 3.995 3.815 
3.83 4.167 3.998 3.375 
3.66 2.0 2.83 3.375 
3.83 2.667 3.248 2.75 
2.33 2.83 2.58 3.125 
3.33 3.25 3.29 2.0 
Tnnsporution 
Chemical Equipment 
Can. Total U.S. 
4.0 3.877 4.2 
3.75 3.465 4.2 
4.0 ).547 4.8 
3.0 2.805 4.2 
3.0 3.052 3.6 
2.5 2.145 3.2 
1 - Low Intensity 
3 - Moderate Intensity 
, - Extreme Intensity 
Can. Total 
3,83 4.015 
1.08 3.64 
4.25 4.525 
3.08 3.64 
2.83 3.215 
2.083 2.642 
Heavy Equipment Ovenll 
Total 
U.S. ('..an. Total 
4.3 4.0 4.059 4.000 
3.66 3.833 3.737 3.715 
4.0 3.5 3.63 3.624 
3.33 2.16 2.524 3.077 
2.66 2.667 2.667 2.885 
2.83 1.83 2.141 2.579 
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APPENDIX 1 (c) 
Extract from Gordon et al (1981: 35) 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TARGET MARKET AND 
PRICING METHOD 
Cost-P1us Pricing Muket Pricing 
Market Type Coefficient Signift':Jnce Coefficient Significance 
Level Le\·el 
.. 
Target !nuket rcquires -.0126 .469 +.1920 .112 
standanl VlUduct 
Target market requires +.2842 .034- -.0593 .353 
custom-made products 
-Statistically significant relationship at the 10%. or 10wer,Ievei. 
Relationship was based on hmp\e correlation coefficient. 
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APPENDIX 1(d) 
Extract from Gordon et aJ (1981: 36) 
FACTORS RELATED TO PRICL'<G METHOD 
CooI·PI ... Prieln, Mukel Prielo, 
lmporunt Facton Coefficient Sig01ficance Coerncient SIa.niticance 
Level Level 
Price of directly 
compelin. products -.2894 .on· +.3790 .006· 
Price of near sub· 
ttitute produ.cts -.1381 .198 +.3994 .005· 
Qu;,!lty of compelin, 
pr\XJucts +.2155 .031· -.3914 .004· 
t::l feet of price on 
company', level of 
employment + .1542 .I6S - .2463 .OS6· 
lfrect of price lin 
company', imaae + .04 IS .391 +.2810 .031· 
Ruction to firm's 
price by government 
agencies + .2432 .060· -.2164 .082· 
Level of backlog 
Olden + .2584 .059· -.1318 .201 
·Sutistically significant relationships at the 10'%, or lower,levei. 
Rel~tionships were based on sample correlation coeffici1:nts. 
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APPENDIX 2(i) 
Extract from Dollery (1983 : 202) 
RANKING OF ACCEPTABLE RATE OF RETuRN ON INVESTMENT 
SAMPLE MEASURE ROW GROUP 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th TOTAL 
COUNT 32 25 7 11 2 0 77 
ROW % 41 ,6 32,5 9,1 14,3 2,6 0,0 
LOw COLU~iN% 19,9 47,2 25,0 47,8 66,7 0,0 
TOTAL% 11 ,9 9,3 2,6 4, 1 0,7 0,0 28,6 
COUNT 63 12 8 10 1 1 95 
ROW % 66,3 12,6 8,4 10,5 1 , 1 1 , 1 
MEDIU~i COLU~;N % 39,1 22,6 28,6 43,5 33,3 100,0 
TOTAL % 23,4 4,5 3,0 3,7 0,4 0,4 35,3 
COUNT 66 16 13 2 0 0 97 
ROW % 68,0 16,5 13,4 2,1 0,0 0,0 
HIGH COLUNN % 41,0 30,2 46,4 8,7 0,0 0,0 
TOTAL % 24,5 5,9 4,8 0,7 0,0 0,0 36,1 
COLUNN 161 53 28 23 3 1 269 
TOTAL 59,9 19,7 10,4 8,6 1 , 1 0,4 100,0 
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Appendix 2(ii) 
Extract from Dollery (1983: 209) 
Response When Production Exceeds Capacity Utilisation Upon Which 
Cost Computations are Based 
PRICE LOW MEDIUM HIGH ROW ~IEASURE CONCEN- COtiCEN- CONCEN-RESPONSE TRATIO~ TRATION TRATION TOTAL 
COUNT 4 6 2 12 
INCREASE ROw % 33,3 50,0 16,7 
PRICE COLU~IN % 4,8 6,3 2,0 
TOTAL % 1,4 2,2 0,7 4,3 
COUNT 5 3 2 10 
DECREASE ROW % 50,0 30,0 20,0 
PRI CE COLUI',N % 6,0 3,2 2,0 
TOTAL % 1 ,8 1 , 1 0,7 3,6 
COUNT 75 86 95 256 
HOLD PRICE ROW% 29,3 33,6 37,1 
CONSTANT COLUMN % 89,3 90,5 96,0 
TOTAL % 27,0 30,9 34,2 92,1 
COLUMN 84 95 99 278 
TOTAL% 30,2 34,2 35,2 100,0 
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APPENDIX 2(i ii) 
Extract from Dollery (1983: 216) 
Ranking of the Goal of Obtaining the Maximum Possible Profits 
RANKING OF OBTAINING THE MAXIMU~I POSSIBLE PROFITS 
SAMPLE ~IEASURE ROw GROUP 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th TOTAL 
COUNT 31 13 8 5 11 9 77 
ROW % 40,3 16,9 10,4 6,5 14,3 11 ,7 LOw COLUI'IN% 46,3 25,5 15,4 18,5 26,2 30,0 
TOTAL% 11 ,5 4,8 3,0 1,9 4, 1 3,3 28,6 
COUNT 18 20 24 10 15 18 95 
ROW % 18,9 21 ,1 25,3 10,5 15,8 8,4 
MEDIUM COLUt',N % 26,9 39,2 46,2 37,0 35,7 26,7 
TOTAL % 6,7 7,4 8,9 3,7 5,6 3,0 35,3 
COUNT 18 18 20 12 16 13 97 
ROw % 18,6 18,6 20,6 12,4 16,5 13,4 
HIGH COLUt'IN % 26,9 35,3 38,5 44,4 38,1 43,3 
TOTAL % 6,7 6,7 7,4 4,5 5,9 4,8 36, 1 
COLUMN 67 51 52 27 42 30 269 
TOTAL 24,9 19,0 19,3 10,0 15,6 11 ,2 100,0 
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APPENDIX 2(jv) 
Extract from Dollery (1983 : 238) 
Use of Pricing Rules 
USE OF LOW MEDIUM HIGH ROW PRICING MEASURE CONCEN- CONCEN- CONCEN- TOTAL RULES TRATION TRAT ION TRATION 
USE COUNT 63 69 78 210 
PRICING ROW % 30,0 32,9 37,1 
RULES COLU~1 N % 74,1 70,4 75,0 TOTAL % 22,0 24,0 27,2 73,2 
DO NOT COUNT 22 29 26 77 
USE ROW % 28,6 37,7 33,8 
PRICING COLUMN % 25,9 29,6 25,0 
RULES TOTAL % 7,7 10,1 9, 1 26,8 
COLUMN 85 98 104 287 
TOTAL % 29,6 34,1 36,2 100,0 
DESCRIP- EMPLOY PRICING RUL ES DO NOT EMPLOY ROW TOTAL nON OF MEASURE PRICING RULES PRICING 
L M H L M H L M H I ~ [Tl :» x 
" 0 <T 
" V> -, [Tl 
V> ." Z 
(") 0 COUNT 10 12 8 8 6 7 18 18 15 ---< <T ~ ENTIREL Y ." x ROW % 55,6 66,7 53,3 44,4 33,3 33,3 0- --h COST- e: -, N COLUMN % 15,9 17,4 10,4 36,4 20,7 26,9 0 ~ BASED ." 3 < TOTAL % 11 ,8 12,2 7 ,8 9,4 6, 1 6,8 21,2 18,4 14,6 <T 
-. 0 0 0 
:J ~ 
~ 
0 ro MOSTLY --h -, 
'< COST-BASED COUNT 39 31 57 10 13 16 49 44 73 [Tl 3 SOME ROW % 79,6 70,5 78,1 20,4 29,5 21,9 "0 
-
<D MARKET COLUMN % 61,9 44,9 74,0 45,5 44,8 61,5 0 co 
'< w CONSIDER- TOTAL % 45,9 31,6 55,3 11 ,8 13,3 15,5 57,6 44,9 70,9 3 .. ro 
" ATION :J N W
<T 
" <J1 
0 
--h 
MOSTLY 
" MARKET- COUNT 10 19 11 3 10 2 13 29 13 
-, 
-. (") 
BASE D ROW % 76,9 65,5 84,6 23,1 34,5 15,4 -. 
:J SOME COST COLUMN % 15,9 27,5 14,3 13,6 34,5 7,7 (Q 
CONSIDER- TOTAL % 11 ,8 19,4 10,7 3,5 10,2 1,9 15,3 29,6 12,6 ;0 e: ATION 
-ro 
V> 
0<: 
COUNT 4 7 1 1 0 1 5 7 2 -. <T 
ENTIREL Y ROW % 80,0 100,0 50,0 20,0 0,0 50,0 ~ 
MARKET COLUMN % 6,3 10, 1 1 ,3 4,5 0,0 3,8 " -, 
BASED TOTAL % 4,7 7, 1 1,0 1 ,2 0,0 1 ,0 5,9 7, 1 1 ,9 -. (") 
-:J 
(Q 
COLUMN 63 69 77 22 29 26 85 98 103 3: ro 
TOTAL 74,1 70,4 74,8 25,9 29,6 25,2 100,0 100,0 100,0 <T ~ 0 
Q. 
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CHAPTER III: THE ESTIMATION ARGUMENT 
3. 1 I NTRODUCTI ON 
The profit maximising model ' s approach to product pricing rests on the 
mathematical truism that profits are maximised when the difference between 
total revenues and total costs is greatest. Since prices must be set at 
the beginning of a given period of trading, it is immedately clear that the 
model's app lication involves estimating costs and revenues into the future, 
and the future is uncertain. Consequently, the model is as good as the 
accuracy of the estimates which it embod ies of expected costs and 
revenues. 1 
Garrison (1985) puts it as follows: 
" the cost and revenue data available to managers are generally 
sufficient to prov ide only rough approximations of the shape of 
the various cost and revenue curves depicted in the models. As 
our methods of measurement are improved and refi ned in years to 
come, this situation may change, but at present managers usually 
have only a general idea of the shape of the demand curve that 
they are faci ng." (503) 
Proponents of cost-plus pricing frequently raise the uncertainty inherent 
in these estimations as an argument in favour of cost-plus pricing on the 
1. See Jackson and Dollery (1984: 683) Sections 3. 1 and 3.2 of this 
chapter are based on this joint article which I published with Dollery. 
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presumption that the information requirements of the cost-plus approach are 
more accurately met. 
This study disputes that claim. The modus operandi of this chapter begins 
with an attempt to show that both methods are based on essential ly similar 
estimates of cost and revenue data and that cost-based methods of pricing 
in no sense overcome the estimation objections levelled against the profit 
maximising model . It will then be argued that, in fact, the profit 
maximising model's approach is superior to the cost-p l us approach in coping 
with the uncertainty of estimat ions into the future, and that the profit 
maximising approach to the problem has other advantages for the pricing 
dec ision. Further, it will be shown that, in any case, there is much 
progress i n the fie ld of making the required estimations and that some 
firms in practice are making use of sophisticated estimation techniques. 
3.2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE DATA AND PROCESSES UPON WHICH THE COMPETING MODELS 
RELY 
In cost-plus pricing, a target volume is selected, and the cost per unit of 
product is estimated at this volume. A des i red markup is added to this 
cost to arrive at a target selling price. Adjustments are then made to 
this target price according to an appraisal of what the market can bear, in 
order to arrive at the actual selling price. 
As po i nted out in Jackson and Dollery (1984: 692) two steps are taken here 
which involve the cost-plus price setter in making essentially similar 
estimates of cost and revenue data as those upon which the profit 
maxim i sing model ' s approach is based. 
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Firstly, a target volume is selected at which the average cost per unit of 
product is computed. The volume which is selected will have an impact on 
the cost per unit because fixed costs per unit are determined by the number 
of units produced, and even marginal costs per unit are not always constant 
for all ranges of production. Furthermore, the volume produced must be 
sold. It then becomes clear that one has to question why this volume is 
chosen in preference to other volumes of production. It must be that the 
price setter feels that this volume is superior to other possible volumes 
of production. "The crux of the matter is that by selecting this volume of 
production he has rejected all other possible volumes of production" 
(Jackson and Dollery, 1984: 692). Thus, even although the cost-based price 
setter has not left a trail of his workings and has not necessarily 
committed his mind carefully to each possible volume of production, he has 
nevertheless estimated that the volume which he uses is the optimum one, by 
rejecting the others and selecting one. 
Secondly, when the cost based price setter considers whether an adjustment 
to the target price is necessary in terms of his appraisal of what the 
market can bear, it must be questioned how the estimat ion is made of the 
necessity and size of that price adjustment . "It is submitted that just as 
with the profit maximising model, estimations must be made about the impact 
of price changes on volume" (Jackson and Dollery, 1984: 689). Once again, 
the selection of this price entails the rejection of all other prices and 
the price setter must have estimated that , considering the effect on volume 
and cost, this price is the optimum price . The fact that cost-plus pricing 
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does not call for the documentation of estimations does not mean that they 
do not have to be made . 
Commenting on the fact that these estimations and decisions are still made 
under cost-pl us pricing approaches, al bei t that they are informally made, 
Edwards (1952) put it as follows: 
"This process of examining the pros and cons, of considering the likely 
effect of a little more or a little less in product quality, in output, 
in price, in selling effort, is none the less important because it 
takes place over the telephone or while walking around the factory, or 
because the actual details of the discussion may very soon be 
forgotten" (299). 
Thu s, it is submitted that even under cost-plus pricing informal esti ma-
tions are made concerning the cost-volume-profit relationship, both in the 
preparation of the cost estimation "and between its preparation and the 
actual determination of the pric e" (Edwards, 1952: 298) . 
It is, in fact, this choice of volume and price which prompted Horngren 
(1981),2 to allege that cost-p lus prici ng entails circular logic because 
the markup which is added to the computed cost to arrive at a price to 
achieve a target (a return on investment, for instance) , is thought to be 
determined by th e cost, but the cost itself is determined partly by the 
volume, and t he volume which can be sold is determined largely by the price 
2. See Horngren (1981: 94) as referred to in chapter one. 
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which is set. Clearly, the profit maximis ing pricing model which requires 
documented estimations of the impact of pr ice on volume and the impact of 
vo lume on cost would be helpful for optima l decis ion making. 
Uncertainty is an attribute of the futu re and the fact that estimations 
frequently have to be made into the future is simply a f act of life. 
Noting the difficulty sometimes encountered in estimating a firm's demand 
curve, Arnold and Hope (1983) commented somewhat harshly: "the cost-plus 
so lution to t hi s problem is simple; ignore it" (165). They went on to 
further criticise the cost-p lus approach saying that such an approach 
contravenes a basic principle of good decision mak ing : " it is better 
to obta in an answer that is approximately right t han one that is precisely 
wrong" (165). 
We now turn our attention to an examination of the manner in which the 
profit maximising model deals with these uncerta intie s . 
3.3 THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PROFIT MAXIMISING MODEL COPES WITH THE 
UNCERTAINTIES INHERENT IN THE DECISION MAK ING PROCESS 
In coping with the required estimations, the profit maximising model has 
the dua l advantages of: 
(1) forcing the decision maker to consciously apply his mind to the task 
of estimating the effects of different prices on costs and volumes; 
and 
(2) leaving a trail of t he expected results of the different options. 
An approach which forces the decision maker to consciously apply his mind 
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to the tasks involved in making a decision facilitates a more thorough and 
logical process. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
recognised thi s well when it said that as an advisor, the "CPA 
approaches the problem in a professional and analytical manner rather than 
relying on intuition as management frequently does in its pricing actions" 
(AICPA, 1965: 1). 
The profit maximising model specifically requires estimates of cost, vo lume 
and revenue at different prices. This necessitates, inter alia, an 
evaluation of the production technique and all aspects of the marketing mix 
at the different prices considered. The formal commitment to an estimate 
for the different options requires an actual articulation of thought 
processes, which must facilitate better analysis. 
The advantage to the analytical process of articulating thoughts must not 
be underestimated. 
Polyani (1973) in his much celebrated enquiry into the nature and justifi-
cation of scientific knowledge pOints out the vital role played by the 
acquisition of linguistic skills in the development of a child ' s 
intelligence. Based on intelligence tests designed to observe the 
development of intelligence in children, Polyani (1973) noted a critical 
acceleration in the development of intelligence once the child begins to 
understand speech and speak itself. Polyani (1973) commented that "by this 
one single trick in which it surpasses the animal, the child acquires the 
capacity for sustained thought" (69). 
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It is important to note that Polyani does not in any sense allege that 
linguistic advantages are the only intellectual advantages that man has 
over animals - man did have the pre-linguistic advantages. However, his 
point is that without articulation man would not be able to develop these 
intellectual advantages. Polyani (1973) sums it up as follows: 
"(1) Man's intellectual superiority is almost entirely due to the 
the use of language. But (2) man's gift of speech cannot itself 
be due to the use of language and must therefore be due to pre-
linguistic advantages. Yet (3) if linguistic advantages are 
excluded, men are found to be only slightly better at solving the 
kind of problems we set to animals" (70). 
It is in this sense that it is submitted that the fact that the profit 
maximising model calls for the estimations of the cost - volume - profit 
relationship of the various options to be consciously addressed and 
documented by the problem solvers, is a considerable advantage. 
It must be stressed that the profit maximising model as illustrated in 
chapter 1 page 10 is in fact calling for an articulation and documentation 
of estimations. The fact that the illustration is done graphically does 
not mean that the thoughts are not articulated. The curves on the graph 
are in fact, a kind of short hand (a very efficient short hand) for words. 
For example, a plotting of a Price P1 and volume 01 is actually saying "It 
is estimated that this firm will be able to sell 01 units at a price of 
P1". This should in no sense be taken as showing a disregard for the 
intuitive thought processes involved in the decision making process. 
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Indeed, Edwards (1952) himself stated "the 'hunches' of the manufacturer 
are not , however, to be disregarded" (304). It is just that the profit 
maximising model wi th its required estimates of the firm 's revenue and cost 
curves can arguably help to: 
(1) ensure that the "hunches" are applied to all the options under 
consideration 
(2) facilitate the commitment of the decision maker's mind to all the 
aspects and procedures which are believed to comprise the outcomes of 
the different options 
(3) co-ordinate the est imations made in the various steps by the different 
people involved in this multi-disciplinary decision 
(4) leave a trail of workings which can be used for both checking the 
logic and accuracy of the procedures in the decision making process 
and for communicating the estimations and expected outcomes re lating 
to the options under consideration to others in the organisation. 
It must be pOinted out that it is not necessari ly being argued that firm s 
should build up an estimation of their entire cost and demand curves. An 
adaption of the profit maximising method, which may frequently be more 
practical, is one that was referred to by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants as far back as 1965 when consider i ng the cost 
- volume - profit relationships at two different volume leve l s for the 
fictional "Raynor Company". 3 Expanding on this, the marginalist approach 
could consider two, or three or four different prices and, together with 
3. See AI CPA (1965: 18) 
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the appropriate production techniques and marketing approaches and sales 
forecasts at each price, the profit could be calculated for those price 
options under consideration. In this manner one could at least get the 
est imated profit opportunities at the current price and at a higher price 
and at a lower price. 
It must be recognised that costs will be incurred in order to gain the 
benefits of having the estimated cost and revenue data. Clearly, the more 
price options considered t he greater the number of estimates and the higher 
the cost. Also, the more thorough the research on the expected impact of 
price changes the greater the cost of the data. Thus, in deciding on the 
nature and extent of the research upon which the estimates will be based, 
the decision maker has to make a cost-benefit analysis. The value of the 
expected benefit can only be quantified once the estimated data is 
obtained. 
Fortu natel y, the costs of the research are more easily obtained. For 
sophisticated market research work, which we wi ll review in section 3.5 of 
this chapter, cost quotations can be obtained. 4 
This dilemma of deciding whether it is worth incurring a cost for an 
unquantified benefit is analogous to the usual internal control decision, 
where the cost of the control is known (for example, an extra person should 
be employed to separate the duties of the cashier and credit controller) 
whilst the benefit remains unquantifiable. 
4. See footnotes on pages 91 and 92. 
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Clearly the concept of materiality is relevant. A very comprehensive 
estimate of revenue at a given price, costing, say R70 000, would not be 
feasible for a small, owner managed firm with a turnover of R100 000 per 
annum. However, such a survey would be feasible for a multinational 
company launching a new product and standing to lose say, R3 million if the 
product fails. In fact, in that case t he question becomes not so much 
whether the firm can afford to do the research for the estimations, but 
whether it can afford not to do the research. 
We have already seen in chapter one that increasing attention is being paid 
to the dist inction between the management of smaller firms and that of the 
larger corporate businesses. The Close Corporations Act, No 69 of 1986, 
recognises the different requirements of smaller, owner managed firms from 
larger, profess ionally managed ones. It seems reasonable then too, t hat in 
this area of pricing, the nature and scope of some research and estimation 
plans would be such that the benefits would only exceed the costs for very 
large firms and smaller firms could only consider much less costly 
forecasting techniques. 5 
Considering the benefits of a formal commitment to the estimations inherent 
in the pricing decision, it is submitted that sometimes the reason for not 
mak ing the estimations required by the model is likely to symptomise x-
5. See footnote 10 on page 91 on the cost of the simple interview approach 
and regression analysis and footnote 12 on page 92 on the cost of the 
comprehensive predictor research model. 
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inefficiency or the failure to apply maximum effort which Liebenste in 
(1978) found to be relevant to decision making on the grounds that "we 
should regard decision making itself as an effortful activity" (p 28). It 
is indisputable that the cost-plus method, which does not call for a range 
of estimations, is a le ss effortful decision making model. This may be the 
true reason for using a cost-plus approach, instead of making the 
estimations called for under the profit maximising approach. 
Further, the absence of estimations of the results of other prices may also 
be an inefficiency in the form of a potential opportunity cost to the firm. 
It is pertinent to note Leibenstein (1978) on the subject of opportunity 
cost: 
"Part of the inputs available to a firm is knowledge of opportunities 
open to it, or the information on how to obtain such knowledge. Thus 
the deviation between the value of maximising the opportunities open 
to the firm and those actually utilised is also part of the X-
i neffi ciency phenomenon" (18). 
The different profits illustrated by the various differences between the 
total revenue curve and the total cost curve should be regarded as 
different opportunities. The cost-plus approach which works with one 
volume may therefore be symptomatic of X-inefficiency since it excludes 
consideration of information about alternative opportunities. 
The fact that the thoughts and information of people involved in the 
decision can be communicated to others in the organisation must be credited 
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as an efficiency advantage of the profit maximising model over the cost-
plus approach. Kaplan, Dirlam and Lanzillotti (1958) showed evidence of 
the different perceptions of the pricing problem held by different people 
with in the organisation. Cases were cited of the pricing officials who 
actually made the decision perceiving the problem in terms of a required 
percentage return on sales, whereas top management who did not actua l ly 
make the decision had viewed the problem in terms of a required return on 
investment. 6 
Leibenstein (1978) categorizes two ways in which the lack of communication 
can cause inefficiency. Firstly, "even though the possibility of an 
improvement might be clearly known somewhere in the organisation, there is 
no way of getting the appropriate information to the attent ion of 
individuals who may be either capable or interested in instituting the 
profitable changes" (175). In this regard, the profit maximising model is 
able to get the information and opportunities down on paper and passed on 
to others. Secondly, "there is frequently a division between those capable 
of introducing changes as against those who might be interested in doing 
so" (175). Again it is submitted that the documentation of thoughts will 
facilitate getting the know ledge of the existence of opportunities across 
to those capable of implementing them. 
In sum then, it is suggested that both approaches rest on essentially 
simi lar estimates of cost and revenue data, but that t he documentation 
6. See Kaplan, Dirlam and Lanzillotti (1958: 18 and 274). 
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required by the profit max imising method copes better with the difficult 
tasks of making these estimations and making the final decision. 
We now turn our attention to showing that, in any case, progress is being 
made by firms in making those estimations. When considering the cost and 
revenue estimations it must be acknowledged that the difficulties with 
sales forecasti ng are greater than with cost estimation. 
3.4 PRODUCT COST 
The ascertainment of product cost is so integra l a part of cost accountancy 
and costing as to be frequently regarded as virtually synonomous with those 
terms. Certainly, it is so large a part of those subjects as to make a 
survey of product costing procedures qui t e impossible here, given the 
vastness of the literature. It is also unnecessary, given the fac t that 
the ascertainment of product cost is formally a standard step for both the 
cost-plus and the profit maximising approaches to product pricing. In 
fact, many commentators, in analysing the difference between the 
economist 's approach and the accountant's approach to pricing, perceive the 
accountant's approach to be the cost-plus one, and further, they see the 
ascertainment of cost as the essence of that approach. Oxenfeldt and 
Baxter (1961) in this context, explained the accountant's approach to 
pricing by saying that the accountant "pays scant attention to demand; he 
collects cost data and arrives at price by manipulating these" (401). 
Owler and Brown (1975: 1), in that year ' s edition of the famous Wheldon's 
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Cost Accounting text, setting out the scope of the subject stated: 
"These costs may be ascertained: 
(a) historical ly, i.e. after they have been incurred, or 
(b) by predetermined standards, combined with subsequent analysis 
of variances between those standards, and the actual cost 
incurred; and 
(c) by the use of marginal methods of presentation for either (a) 
or (b), involving the differentiation between 'fixed' and 
'variable' costs." 
Tod ay, var ious methods to aid in differentiat ing between fixed and 
variable costs including the use of s imple and multiple regression 
analysis,are covered in standard texts on cost and management accounting. 7 
The principle of regression analysis which rests on the identification of 
causative factors which influence a dependent variable (like cost) will be 
looked at later in this chapter when revenue forecasting is examined. 
Nevertheless, one addition to the vast literature on the subject of product 
cost does deserve mention here. The aid to practitioners in ass isting 
clients with product pricing issued by the AICPA in 1985 puts so many of 
the ideas of the literature into the form of a work programme for the 
practitioner that it serves as an excellent check list in the task of 
ascertaining product cost. 
7. See Garrison (1985: 171-177) and Horngren (1982: 286, 300) and Killough 
and Leinenger (1984 : 697-720). 
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Appendix 
programme. 
contains a random extract, by way of example, of the AICPA 
We now turn our attention to the more difficult task of revenue estimation. 
3.5 REVENUE ESTIMATION 
Historical sales data are generally used as a starting point in preparing a 
sales forecast. "Forecasters examine sales data in relation to various 
factors, including prices, competitive conditions, availability of supp li es 
and general economic conditions" (Garrison, 1985: 305). Broadbent (1980: 
532) noted t hat two major decisions have to be made in every brand's annual 
plan; namely, its price and the amount to be spent on advertising. 
Indeed, as will be discussed in chapter four of this study, all of the 
elements of the marketing mix have to be decided. 
explain that even if firms did not know the price 
products, those elasticities still, of course, 
Broadbent went on to 
elasticities of their 
ex i s t. At the Vienna 
conference he said that, in fact, his argument was that "we do now know how 
to estimate and use price and ad(vertising) elasticities" (536). This is 
not to say that he felt these elasticities could be perfectly estimated. 
He acknowledged that such an ideal could never exist, but it does show the 
confidence with which he could embrace the topic of these estimations. 
So rapid has been the progress and prevalence of forecasting techniques in 
the last decade, that the Harvard Business Review published a review 
article by Georgoff and Murdick (1986: 113) which included the compilation 
of a chart which identified what they considered to be the "20 most common 
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forecasting techniques" and gave a brief evaluation of them. 
Mindful of the fact that pricing is a multi-disciplinary act and the 
National Association of Accountant's advice (Gordon et ai, 1980) that 
"pricing decisions utilise the talents and know-how of many individuals 
across several functional areas" (11) it is not necessary and would not be 
productive for an accounting analysis to attempt to make a study of the 
marketing discipline's role of sales forecasting . The object of the 
accounting and economic analysis was just to show that the profit 
maximising pricing model is best designed to cope with and use the 
marketer's forecasts. However, by way of evidence that marketers are 
making these estimations and to encourage the accountant's reference to the 
marketer's models (many of which are refined to the pOint of user 
friendliness for specialists outside of the marketing discipline) a brief 
overview wi II be made of the approaches to forecasting and a case history 
will be cited. 
Georgoff and Murdick (1986: 113) categorised four different approaches to 
forecasting: (1) judgemental; (2) counting methods; (3) time series 
methods ; and (4) association or causal methods. 
Judgemental methods are self explanatory, varying essentially in terms of 
the care given to each step in the estimation and to the number and 
selection of the people involved in the judgemental estimates. 
Counting methods consist of market testing, consumer market surveys and 
industrial market surveys. Market testing is described as "representative 
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buyers' responses to new offerings, tested and extrapolated to estimate the 
product ' s future prospects" (Georgoff and Murdick: 113). The approach of 
market surveys is described as one under which "attitudinal and purchase 
intentions data (are) gathered from representative buyers" (113). 
Under time series methods, time is the variable against which a pattern is 
ana lysed. The major methods of the time series approach are: (1) movi ng 
averages; (2) exponential smoothing; (3) adaptive filtering; (4) time 
series extrapolation; 
Jenkins. 8 
(5) time series decomposition; and (6) Box-
Association or causal methods attempt to identify the variables upon which 
the forecasted item (volume of sales, for example) is dependent and to 
measure the estimated effect of these variables on the dependent var i able. 
The maj or methods are: (1) correlation methods; (2) regression models; 
(3) leading indicators; 
models. 9 
(4) econometric models; (5 ) input-output 
In order to get an idea of the prevalence and sophistication of approac hes 
to estimating the impact of price on volume of sales in South Africa I 
visited a leading marketing consulting firm in Johannesburg. They assured 
8. See Wits Business School (October 1986) pages 5.4 to 6.6 and pages 15.1 
to 15.6. 
9. See Georgoff and Murdick (1986: 110-120) and Wits Business School 
(October 1986) pages 10.1 to 16.7 and Brodie and de Kluyver (1984: 194-
201) . 
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me that they regarded price as a very important variable in the marketing 
mix and, indeed showed me that they do, in fact, do research for clients on 
estimating the impact of price on volume of sa le s. 
Thi s marketing firm found that one useful way of categorising all its 
pricing research approaches was into three broad categories, namely: 
(1) Surveys; 
(2) Surveys including the use of a simulated t est market; 
(3) Historical data techniques. 
Surveys can take the form of simple questioning techniques concerning the 
respondent's preferences at different prices or more sophisti cated methods 
embracing trade-off choices by the respondent. 10 Concerning trade-off 
analysis, respondents are asked to make a choice amongst options with 
different attributes being cons idered. The different combinations of 
attributes cou l d, for examp le , be different prices of the client's own 
brand and different product qualities, like quality and pack size, and 
different possible retaliatory prices of the competing brand which cou ld be 
expected to coexist with the client' s different price options. Appendix 2 
is an extract from an illustration used in the in-house training of a 
lead ing South African marketing consultant. The trade off data is then 
analysed for this marketing consultant via conjoint analysis by the aid of 
10. This company would quote approximately R8 000 for the simple 
questioning research study and about R20 000 for the conjoint ana lys is 
with t hree prices and two other attributes. Each extra price 
considered on the conjoint analysis would cost approximately an extra 
R5 000 . The starting price for a regression analysis model would be 
approximately R2 000. 
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a computer program developed by Demotab Limited, their London 
consultants. 11 This enables an estimated demand curve to be drawn for any 
brand under any combination of its possible attributes and a competitive 
brand's pricing. 
Turning our attention to the approach of a survey including a simulated 
test market, we now encounter a very comprehensive model which tests all 
the main marketing variables in a realistic environment and makes 
predictions of market shares under the different conditions of the 
variables in the marketing mix (including price) for the options under 
consideration. It is especially popular for the launching of new products. 
A number of models are available which incorporate computer programmed 
analysis of the data by experts, for example, the Predictor model produced 
by Demotab Limited, London, and the Assessor Model produced by Novaction, 
Paris and the Bases Tracking Model produced by Burke, Marketing Research 
Ltd, in the United States of America. The market research firm which I 
interviewed in Johannesburg uses Predictor. The research programme using 
Predictor involves two stages, namely, the central location interviews and 
the in-house recall interviews. 12 
At the central location stage, via questions, preference data relating to 
the various elements of the marketing mix are obtained. The next step is 
11. See Green and Vithala (1971: 
and Wind (1975: 107-115) and 
and Stanton (1982: 106-111). 
355-363) on conjoint analysis and Green 
Johnson (1974: 121-127) and Mohn, Roane 
12. This market research firm quotes R50 000 - R60 000 for the complete 
Predictor research study. Each additional price tested would cost an 
extra amount of approximately R10 000. 
to take the respondents 
shelves have been erected . 
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into a simulated shop in which a set of 
The test brand is merchandised with all 
shop 
the 
main competitive brands. The ruling current prices of all brands and pack 
sizes are labelled. A quote from the in-house literature of this market 
research firm states "the test brand can either be tested at one or more 
than one price point to measure potential at different prices". The 
respondents are given money vouchers to spend however they wish in the 
simulated shop. They take home whatever they buy with these vouchers. In 
orde r to make the test as rea list ic as poss i b Ie the respondent s are even 
allowed to cash in the vouchers for real money which they can keep and not 
purchase anything in the simulated shop. 
The second stage consists of a recall interview three to four weeks later 
to get a measure of expected repeat buying behaviour. The informants are 
also given an opportunity at this stage to purchase the test product again 
with their own money. 
This particular Johannesburg market research firm then sends the data for 
processing to Demotab in London, who have in-depth experience in t he 
technique and have developed specialised software for the model. The major 
output is a prediction of the market share, which can be translated into a 
volume of units. It is noteworthy that the model has been employed in over 
five hundred studies worldwide. 
Considering now the historical data techniques, the most important for 
pricing for this marketing firm currently is multiple regression, with an 
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increasing interest in the Box-Jenkins model. 13 
multiple regression equation is: 
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + 
where, 
The General form of the 
Y is the dependent variable; for example, Sales, 
a, b1, b2 ... bm are the regression coefficients 
X1' X2 , X3 ... Xm are independent variables, (such as price of brand, 
competing brands price, 
advertising, etc.) 
The object, of course, is to "unscramble" the data in order to get a 
measure of the impact which each of the variables effecting sales has on 
sales. 
This marketing firm is particularly impressed with the Adstock Model which, 
via autocorrelation (correlating a variable with itself, but a period 
lagged, to account for the time lag inherent in the effect which 
advertising, for example, has on sales), can we ight the relative importance 
of the different variables in the marketing mix and estimate future sales 
for alternative marketing mixes. 14 
Considering the difficulty of estimating competitor's price retaliations, 
it should be noted that when analysing the effect on sales in the past, of 
changes in the marketing mix, including a price change, the historical 
13. See Wits Business School (October 1986) pages 15.4 to 15.6 on Box-
Jenkins Modelling. 
14. See Broadbent (1984) on the Adstock model. 
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change in sales of the firm will have inc luded any price retaliations which 
the firm's price change will have caused. Further, it must be noted that 
under cost-plus pr icing a decrease in pr i ce due to a decrease in cost 
could also ca use pr icing reta l iations by competitor s. Also, under any form 
of pricing, unless one commits one's mind to making the estimates, one 
would not know whether a current price is not, in fact, a price which is 
causing retaliations by competitors. The fact will always remain t hat, no 
matter how difficult the task is of estimating the impact of price on 
volume, a method such as the profit maximising model, which calls for a 
commitment to estimating the effect of options, must be an aid in coping 
with the uncertainty inherent in the availabil i ty of choice. 
It is opt imi stiC to note the commitment of market researchers to rational 
estimation. When visiting th is market research firm in Johannesburg, I was 
fortunate enough to be privy to the actual data of a case history of an 
actual estimat ion of sa les based on an historical data analysis and the 
actual results. We note that the modelled li ne, which is based on the 
coefficients calculated for the independent variables, is only used for 
pred iction if it f ares well when tested against the actual past sales. 
Figure 1 shows the actual and the modelled sales for an actual product of a 
company. 
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Figure 1: Model predictions to actual sales in 1978 
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Thus we see that there are firms which are estimating their sales and that 
this can be done skilfully. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
We have seen in this chapter that both the cost-plus and profit-
maximising models rely on estimates of essentially similar data. It is 
further submitted that the profit max im ising model copes much better with 
these estimates and the analysis of them, than cost-plus pricing. 
Furthermore, we have seen that firms are making these estimates in practice 
and advancement in this field of estimation is progressing rapidly. 
It is fitting to conclude this chapter by quoting the concluding remark of 
Broadbent's (1980) paper delivered at the Admap conference in Vienna. 
Commenting on the fact that elasticities could never be estimated perfectly 
he said that what is nevertheless suggested, is an aid to successful 
adaptation and concluded by saying: 
"Any successful, surviving organism explores its environment, 
observes, learns and adapts. What is suggested is an aid to 
the successfu l evolution of a brand" (538). 
Indeed, we are forced to question whether the failure to use a model which 
demands a committed exploration of options is not a manifestation of 
Leibenstein's (1978) X- inefficiency. 
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Appendix 
Extract from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA 1985: 20) publication "Assisting Clients in Determining 
Pricing for Manufactured Products". 
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Appendix 2 
Trade Off Analysis 
Extrade from An Illustrative Example used In-House by a Market 
Research Consulting Firm 
A hypothetical example of a particular respondent's choices is shown below: 
Brand A 
Brand B 
Brand C 
Brand 0 
Brand E 
Brand F 
i 
PRICE 
CUR-
-15% -10% - 5% RENT + 5% +10% 
23 24 . 
• 25 26 
7 8 15 16 21 
13 14 19 20 22 
1 2 5 9 10 
3 4 6 11 12 
Starting all brands off at 15% below. their current 
price, this respondent's first choice is Brand E. 
The price of this brand is increased to 10% below 
current price. The choice is again Brand E. The 
process is continued up·to choice number 27. 
Demotab, our London consul tants, has 
developed a computer programme to analyse the 
trade-off data. 
It enables a demand curve to be drawn for any 
brand under any combination of the 
competitive brands' pricing. 
17 
18 
+15% 
27 
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CHAPTER IV: THE MARKETING MIX ARGUMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
Another standard argument used to support the exclusion of the profit 
maximising model is the fact that many factors other than price can have a 
significant impact on t he volume of units of a product which can be sold. 
The argument as stated by Garrison (1985) reads: 
"A third limitation of the general models arises from the fact that 
price is just one element in the marketing of a product. Many 
other factors must also be considered that can have a significant 
impac ton the number of uni ts of a product that can be sold a t a 
given price. Among these factors are promotional strategy, product 
design, intensity of selling effort, and the selection of distribu-
tion channe ls." (503) 
Whilst this study fully agrees that there are many other elements which 
comprise the marketing mix and which effect the number of units sold, it 
disputes the claim that this precludes t he application of the profit 
maximising model in setting price and vo lume of production. To the 
contrary, it will be argued that the modus operandi of the model is 
particularly well suited to embracing the total cost and total revenue 
estimations associated with the various marketing mix options facing a 
product line and illustrating the expected outcomes of these opt ions. 
The criticism is really just a "straw man" argument. A false proposit ion 
is initially set up implying that the profit maximising model alleges that 
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price is the only variable impacting on the number of units sold . This 
false proposition is then attacked with the demonstration of the banal fact 
that other factors also affect the number of units sold. The slain straw 
man, in the form of this defeated false propos ition, is then offered as 
proof of the inadequacy of the model. 
4.2 The Model Identifies the Marketing Options by Their Price 
At the outset it must be emphasised that in no sense whatsoever does the 
profit maximising model assume or suggest that the full gamut of marketing 
variables are not used at any of the prices under consideration. The model 
simply calls for the estimations of cost and volume at the different 
selling prices, taking fully into consideration all the elements of the 
marketing mix which will be applied at the different prices. 
Indeed, the fact that the total cost, including all market ing costs is 
required at each option under consideration, will facilitate the commitment 
of the decision makers' minds to the marketing mix at the different prices 
and thus emphasise these elements and help identify different marketing mix 
opportunities. This will further aid the task of forecasting volumes of 
sales; and the model integrates the forecasted revenues with the expected 
costs of sales, including marketing costs, to show the net expected 
results. 
Nobody would deny that price is an important element of the marketing mix. 
As can be seen in Appendix 1 of this chapter, Dollery's (1983) study of 
South African manufacturing firms showed 42,5% of competit i ve firms ranking 
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pricing as the most important aspect of their marketing strategy and 23,4% 
of oligopolistic firms ranking pricing as the most important element of 
the ir marketing strategy and 33,3% of monopolistic firms ranking pricing as 
the most important element of their marketing strategy. We recall that in 
chapter two of this study we noted that overall, the firms in the American 
and Canadian study did view pricing decisions as a key item in their 
product ' s survival. 1 
In addition, of course, many other factors effect volume of sales. The 
elements of the marketing mi x (also called 'marketing decision variables' 
or 'parameters of marketing action') are defined as "all variables under 
the firm's control that can affect the level of demand" (Kotler, 1971: 53). 
No li st could ever be considered to be exhaustive, especially when it is 
considered that the length of such a I ist depends partly on the categorisa-
tion method and specification detai l employed in the making of the list. 
Kotler (1971: 53) refers to a list compiled by Borden (1965) with twelve 
categories and thirty one variables as one of the most extensive. 2 Kotler 
(1971) analyses the marketing mix under the four variables of price, 
product, distribution and promotion. This four-factor classification was 
led to prominence by McCarthy (1964). 
1. See Appendix 1 (b) of chapter 2. 
2. See Neil H Borden: "The Concept of the Marketing Mix" in George 
Schwartz, ed , "Science in Marketing" (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 
1965), pp 389-390. 
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Now, in no sense at all, is it required that pricing must be the most 
important element of the marketing mix in order for the estimations of the 
costs and revenues associated with the various optional mixes to be 
organised in a manner which identifies the selling price of each mix, as 
does the profit maximising model. 
4.3 The Model embraces the Entire Marketing Mix 
The model as illustrated in chapter one page 10 could, in fact, have the X-
axis labelled so as to identify, at each predicted volume of units sold, 
not only the price, as is traditional, but also the other elements of the 
marketing mix associated with each price. This is to say that underneath 
price P1 for Mix 1, it could also show Al as a shorthand for the promotion 
plan included in Mix 1 , and Pr1 as a shorthand to identify the product 
design of Mix 1 , and Dl as shorthand to identify the distribution plan of 
Mix 1. 
We would then have a graph labelled as in Figure 1. 
As it is, the shorthand is more efficient and it is understood that the 
volume expected to be sold at price P1 will be fully marketed with the 
appropriate marketing mix, and the total cost Tel is, indeed, the estimated 
cost taking all these factors into account. 
Even if one of the other elements of the mix, e.g. advertising, were 
considered to be the starting point, the marketing plan could not be 
completed without setting a price, and once all the elements are set and 
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Figure 1 
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Volume (Units) 
Price (Rands) 
Total Cost 
Total Revenue 
Design (Draughtsman's Plan No.) 
Distribution (Distribution Plan No.) 
Promotion (Promotion Plan No.) 
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the costs appropriately estimated, the optional mixes can be identified on 
the x-axis in terms of quantity and se ll ing price. This is done for the 
sake of simplicity and illustrative value, because total revenue, which is 
unarguably an important factor, is the volume of units sold multiplied by 
the selling price, and profit is the difference between total revenue and 
total cost. 
4.4 Sales Estimation Takes the Marketing Mix into Account 
Thus, it is just that the profit maximising model arranges the estimations 
of the options in price order. It does not exclude the other elements of 
the marketing mix. Indeed, much of the content of chapter 3 of this study, 
is in fact relevant to this chapter in that it also disproves the argument 
that the profit maximising model does not take into account the other 
factors impacting on volume of sales. This is so because the maximising 
model calls for estimations of volume for different options and this 
requires that sales forecasts be made. When we studied sales forecasting 
it became very 
precisely with 
clear that a core element of that subject is concerned 
identifying the factors which impact on sales volume and 
attempting to measure the effect of those factors. 
In chapter three, when discussing surveys, we saw that under trade-off 
analysis, an attempt is made to measure the extent to which a consumer is 
prepared to trade off one attribute, for example, price, against others 
like product quality, or pack size or distribution ease. The marketing 
research firm which I visited used conjoint analysis and an extract from 
their in-house literature reads : 
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"Conjoint analysis can be used for evaluat ing new products 
for altering elements of the product mix of an existing 
product, for evaluating importance of attributes, for 
testing price sensitivity and finally, for predict i ng 
brand share for alternat ive product combinations". 
Clearly, the various elements of the marketing mix are taken into account 
and clear ly, the volume forecast, based on the brand share, can be 
integrated into the profit maximising pricing model. 
Similarly, this market research firm describes the basic aim of the Adstoch 
Model which we looked at in chapter three, as being "to explore the 
relationship between sales and various marketing inputs". For example, one 
case history showed that the relative weights of the marketing variables 
under consideration for a product were: 
Distribution 100 
Radio Advertising 59 
Price 52 
Television Advertising 48 
This aids the estimation of market shares and volumes for t he different 
marketing mix options under consideration. Once again, it must be stressed 
that the forecasts for the various options can then be integrated into the 
profit maximising pricing model. 
Similarly, the historical data techniques take cognisance of all elements 
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suspected of inf luencing the volume of sales. For example, the variables 
in the multiple regression formula are typically the well established 
marketing mix elements. 3 
4.5 The Model Accounts for the Cost of the Whole Mix 
Thus, in no sense whatsoever are other elements of the marketing mix 
ignored when forecasting volumes of sales at different prices. Sometimes, 
one element of the mix can vary whilst other elements can be held constant 
over the whole range of production being considered. In other instances 
price, for example, could be under consideration for a wide range of 
changes whilst it may be felt that one of the other elements in the mix, 
say advertising, could be held constant for a range of prices; but that it 
would have to be increased beyond a certain threshold price and that 
thereafter it could be held constant until another threshold price barrier 
is broken. This would be accounted for in the profit maximising pricing 
model as illustrated in figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows total costs rising after P1 to account for the fact that a 
fixed advertising cost increase would be incurred at prices higher than P1 
because a new marketing mix with more advertising expenditure would be used 
at prices above P1. 
Similarly, it could be that a more expensive packaging for example, would 
be used at prices above P2. 
3. See chapter 3 page 94 . 
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Figure 3 shows that the slope of the total cost curve is steeper after 
price P2' accounting for the fact that more expensive packaging is used for 
each unit sold at prices above P2. 
In an extreme case of mix interdependency it could be that all the elements 
in the mix would have to change whenever any price change occurred. It has 
already been acknowledged in chapter three that it may not be feasible to 
draw up estimations of the firm's entire cost and revenue curves. 4 
Such a case would again call for the approach requiring cost and revenue 
estimations for on ly a few marketing mix options under consideration. 
Agai n, the cost benefit analysis suggested in chapter t hree would be 
necessary to determine the nature and extent of the research which would be 
suitable. Once again the scale of operation for the product under 
consideration would determine the size of the potential benefit and the 
level of cost which would be feasible. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Thus , we have seen that for both the sales forecasts and the estimates of 
the associated costs, all the elements of the marketing mix are taken into 
account. In the same paper in which Broadbent (1980) expounded on 
estimating price elasticities he also spoke of advertising elasticities and 
said that we must investigate how they effect volume and profit when 
changed "together" (534). 
4. See chapter 3 page 81 of this study. 
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The argument that one cannot consider the effect of price changes because 
there are other elements in the marketing mix is simply false. When a 
construction engineering firm builds bridges using a certain type of sand, 
it knows that sand is not the only element of the building mix. This does 
not stop it considering more efficient processes using a different texture 
of sand, even though that will cause other changes to be made to other 
elements of the building mix. If the strength of cement then, for example, 
must also change, that does not mean that the option of a progressive 
change is excluded. The fact that a mix of elements is involved is not 
peculiar to marketing. In all aspects of human endeavour, where a mix of 
inputs is used, a search nevertheless is made for the optimum mix. 
In no sense can the difficulty in identifying marketing mix options for the 
estimations be considered to be an argument against the maximising model 
since a marketing mix will have to be chosen anyway. Furthermore, as we 
saw in chapter three, the selection of one option automatically entails the 
reject ion of all other options and ignoring those options does not overcome 
the problem of assessing the value of those opportunities. 
We have already seen in chapter three that part of the inputs available to 
a firm is the knowledge of opportunities open to it. The maximising model 
forces a commitment to an estimation of the results of the options and 
integrates the interdisciplinary data into an illustrative decision-making 
model . This study therefore submits that to preclude the use of the model 
on the strength of the false implication that the model excludes the non-
price elements of the marketing mix , could be a manifestation of 
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Leibenstein 's (1978) X-inefficiency. 
This false argument brings to mind the imagery of Truu (1983) . When 
arguing against another "straw man" argument he compared the author of the 
argument to Don Quixote who "attacked windmills because he mistook them for 
evi I giants" (567). 
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Chapter V: THE ARGUMENT THAT PRO FIT MAX IMISATION MAY NOT BE THE SOLE OR 
MAIN GOAL OF THE FIRM 
5. 1 I nt roduct i on 
Proponents of cost-plus pricing argue against the profit maximising model 
on the grounds that profit maximisation may not be the primary or sole goal 
of firms. 
Garrison's (1985) exposition of this argument reads as follows: 
"A final limitation of the general model s is that even if business 
firms had a precise knowledge of the slope of their demand curves, 
we cannot automatically assume that they would price in such a way 
as to maximise profits. The reason is that this might bring 
accusations from the public of 'profiteering' and 'chargin g all 
that t he traffic will bear'. Rather than attempting to maximise 
profits, many firms seek only to earn a 'satisfactory ' profit for 
the company. They think in terms of a reasonable return on the 
investment that has been made in the company, and they stri ve to 
set prices in such a way as to earn that return. The concept of a 
satisfactory profit underlies the actions of a great many business 
firms today" (503). 
This study fully accepts that profit maximisation is not the only goal of 
the firm and that it is also frequently not the primary goal of the firm. 
However it disputes the claim that this precludes the use of the profit 
maximising pricing model in setting the firm's price and output levels. 
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Indeed, it will be argued t hat the coexistence of often competing goals 
makes the use of this decision making model all the more necessary and 
advantageous. 
The modus operandi of this chapter begins by drawing attention to the fact 
that the maximising model illustratively summarises the volume, cost, 
revenue and profit effects of the different marketing mix options. · It will 
be shown that this illustration can be used to achieve other objectives of 
the firm. It will then be argued that Garrison's (1985) explanation of the 
reason that firms may not maximise profits is an oversimplification of the 
problem and that this type of overs implication leads to an omission in the 
standard managerial accounting texts' coverage on pricing of how the model 
is useful as a constraint-maximisation decision making model in the 
business environment of competing objectives. Reference will again be made 
to the empirical data of the two major pricing studies used in chapter two. 
An illustration will be given of how the maximis ing model can be used to 
advantage for a firm with many goals, taking into account all of the eight 
pricing goals which the National Association of Accountants considered to 
be the most important goals of the firm. 
5.2 The Profit Maximising Model Can be Adapted into a Constraint-Maximisa-
tion Decision Model 
At the outset it is important to remind ourselves that it was stressed in 
chapter one that it is not prof it maximisation which is being defended in 
this study, but the profit maximising dec isi on model. This distinction is 
vital because it is only when the model is properly perceived as a decision 
making model that its full illustrative value can be appreciated. 
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Referring to the general set out of the model in Figure 1 on page 10 it 
must be understood that the model illustratively summarises the revenue, 
cost, volume and profit which can be expected at each of the different 
prices under consideration. Each different price (which is associated with 
a whole marketing mix) yields its own volume, revenue and profit. All of 
these profits, volumes, prices and revenues are shown including but not 
only the profit maximising ones. This is the crux of the matter. Each 
different price must be seen as a different opportunity1 - with the volume, 
revenue, cost and prof it effect illustratively summarised. This summary 
can be used to indicate the price which best would achieve any goal, for 
example, revenue maximisation, or market sha re maximisation (volume) and 
further, it can be used to advantage to indicate the price which best would 
satisfy competing goals. 
5.3 Revenue Maximisation 
Baumol (1959) recognised the importance that firms attach to the value of 
their sales and, in what has been described as a "minor revo lution in 
microeconomic theory,,2 he pioneered a model which sees revenue maximisation 
as the main goal of corporate management with the profit goal relegated 
to a constraint which management believes to be the minimum level of profit 
which the shareholders find acceptable. Graphically this can be 
represented as follows: 
1. It must be noted that we saw in chapter 4 tha t Leibenstein (1978) saw 
the knowledge of opportunities open to the firm as part of the inputs 
of the firm which mayor may not be used efficiently. 
2. See Wildsmith (1973: 60). 
11 7 
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Figure 1 indicates that revenue will be maximised at price P4 and that the 
profit constraint will be satisfied at this price. The model shows that it 
would be feasible to set the price at P4 although profit is maximised at 
price P3. Of course, if the profit constraint were set at a higher level, 
with the minimum profit constraint intersecting the total profit curve 
before price P4, then the model would indicate that revenue maximisation 
must be constrained to that pOint. Thus, clearly, the model can be used to 
achieve objectives of the firm other than profit maximisation. What is 
particularly noteworthy, and ironically so, is the fact that the above 
illustration shows how advantageous the model is in dealing with a target 
return on investment (the minimum profit constraint), together with other 
objectives . This is ironical because a target return on investment is 
sometimes argued as a goal which militates against the maximising model in 
favour of cost-plus pricing. Yet, the maximising model copes with the 
satisfaction of a target return on investment together with other goals. 
5.4 Multiple Goals 
Garrison's (1985) explanation of the reason that firms may not maximise 
profits is an oversimplification of the problem. He alleges that the 
reason is that profit maximisation might bring accusations of 
'profiteering' and that firms therefore strive to earn what they consider 
to be a satisfactory profit . This explanation omits two whole schools of 
thought, namely, the managerial school and the behav ioural school. 
In chapter one we saw that the behavioural theorists perceived the goal of 
a satisfactory profit as consistent with a general trait of human 
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behaviour, namely, satisficing. We saw that human be ings will frequently 
satisfice rather than undertake the more burdensome task of maximising. 
Lei benstein (1978) showed that we could expect this to be all the more 
prevalent in the case of an agent who is acting on behalf of his principal 
rather than for himself. 
We also saw that with the growing separation of ownership from control of 
firms, the managerial school takes into account the fact that managers may 
maximise their own utility by pursuing different goals from those of the 
shareholders. Leibenstein (1978) also captured the essence of this when he 
said that "agents are likely to have different interests and effort levels 
from principals" (17). Furthermore, Ga lbraith (1967)3 has argued that the 
different interest groups within management and employees of the large 
corporate enterprises will all have a bearing on decisions which are made. 
Thus, with in the firm there will be many competing goals pursued with 
different effort levels by different members of the organisation. It is 
only when this complexity is recognised that the value of the profit 
maximising decision making model can be fully appreciated. 
5. 4.1 Increasing a Minimum Constraint Level 
Let us first consider the trait of agents satisficing with lower effort 
levels than principals. The use of the maximising model could illustrate 
to principals that profit options, other than the minimum profit constraint 
3. See Galbraith (1967: chapter 6). 
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do exi st, and they could attempt to raise the "minimum profit constraint" 
to a "revised minimum profit constraint" as shown in Figure 2. 
The knowledge of the range of opportunities could cause the principals to 
attempt an increase not only in the constraint level but also in the degree 
of constraint concern. Leibenstein (1978) commented that "the less the 
degree of constraint concern, the less, on the average, an individual will 
feel a sense of obligation to what he views to be the interest of the firm" 
(26). Figure 2 shows that if the "minimum profit constraint" is raised to 
the "revised minimum profit constraint" , prices wi II need to be set between 
price P5 and price P6. 
5.4 . 2 Imposing a Maximum Profit Constraint 
If the constraint on the profit maximisation goal was as simple as j ust the 
need to avoid a "profiteering" allegation as Garrison (1985) suggests, this 
could simply be accounted for in t he maximising model by adding a "ma ximum 
profi t constraint" at the percei ved acceptable profit level as shown in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3 shows that in order to avoid a "profiteering" allegation, price 
must be set below price P7 or above price P8. Since the profiteering 
allegation is likely to be levelled at higher prices, this constraint would 
probably demand that the price be set between P9 and P7. 
maximise revenue within this constraint. 
Price P7 would 
R 
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5.4.3 Satisfying Multiple Objectives 
However, the problem is more complex because "firms pursue mu ltiple 
objectives in setting their prices".4 
In the study of American and Canadian firms conducted by the National 
Association of Accountants, the respondents were questioned on the 
importance of eight objectives often cited as important to pricing 
pol icies. 
sca le of 
They were asked to rate the importance of the objectives on a 
to 5, "where 5 indicated that the objective was of prime 
importance and indicated that t he objective did not play a role in 
pric ing decisi ons".5 Appendix 1 summarises the resu lts of the responses 
recei ved. 
The study (Gordon et aI, 1981) found that the firms "generally were 
concerned with a mix between satisfactory profits, return on investment, 
market share and total sa les" (9). However, they did find differences 
between firms within this generalisation; for example, for "firms selling 
standard products, market share was the dominant,,6 objective, whilst firms 
dealing in custom made products were more concerned with return on 
investment and job security. 
4. See Gordon et al (1981: 9). 
5. See Gordon et a1 (1981 : 15). 
6. See Gordon et a1 (1981: 15). 
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It is noteworthy that concern for total profits was the most highly rated 
pricing objective. It is also equally true that many other objectives must 
be taken into account. 
Dollery (1983) found most South African manufacturing companies being 
primarily concerned with obtaining an acceptable return on investment and 
obtaining the maximum profits Possible.? His study did show support for 
other objectives as well. 
The usefulness of the model can best be appreciated with an illustration of 
its application in an environment in whi ch a certain minimum level of 
profits is required simultaneously with the pursuit of all of the other 
seven objectives considered by the National Association of Accountants' 
study. In addition, the goal of a good image (not a "profiteer") will be 
included. 
It wi 11 be assumed that the goal of a "return on investment" (ROJ) imposes 
a minimum profit constraint and that the degree of satisfaction of the 
total profits goal is illustrated on the total profit curve. 
The level of satifaction of the "sales" goa l is illustrated on the total 
revenue curve. Market share is illustrated on the x axis (volume). The 
satisfaction of the concern with the price earnings ratio is consistent 
with the concern for total profits which is measured on the total profit 
line. It is likely that employee job security and industrial relations 
? See Appendix 2. 
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wi 11 be served by a high volume of output which is measured on the x-axis, 
or, at least, with the maintenance of a minimum output level. 8 
Industrial relations could simultaneously be perceived as being dependent 
on good employee wages, salaries and benefits which could be seen to impose 
a minimum total cost constraint, which I have labelled the "revised total 
cost" curve. Lower selling prices (which are illustrated on the x-axis) 
would probably be conducive to a high stock turnover and would probably 
favour short-term liquidity.9 The deSire to avoid being seen as a 
"profiteer" imposes a maximum profit constraint. This can be illustrated 
graphically as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 shows that taking into account the maximum profit constraint (set 
to avoid a "profiteer" image) and the minimum profit constraint (set to 
satisfy a target return on investment) and a "revised minimum tota l cost 
constraint curve (set in the interests of industrial relations) the 
feasible price range is P12 to P14 and P15 to P13 . Since the maximum 
8. The employee level could also be threatened by a volume increase 
requiring a less labour intensive innovation. In that case, the 
concern for job security and industrial relations would have to be 
coped with by the model with the block-out of a range of prices and 
volumes. Figure 7 illustrates how the model can deal with a block-out 
of a range of prices. 
9. It may be that expansion beyond a certain volume would require capi tal 
expenditure which would harm short-term liquidity. This could be taken 
into account in the model by a maximum constraint imposed at such a 
volume on the x-axis. Whatever the price range deemed necessary for 
any goa l , it could be satisfied by imposing minimum and maximum 
constraint lines at either end of such a range on the x-axis. See 
Figure 6. The minimum and maximum constraints for liquidity would be 
der ived best from cash flow forecasts. 
R 
126 
Revised Total Cost 
Total Cost 
Total Revenue 
Revised Total Profit 
Total Profit 
1-H"+-___ --::6f-"-----If----'~:_+~~'----Max imum Profit Constraint 
J-+ __ ~iI'----+---II---l-......,:~----Minimum Profit 
Constraint 
R 
i 
~4 ~ 14 3 Output Price 
Figure 4 
127 
profit constraint is likely to have been aimed at curbing price increases, 
the feasible price range is likely to be P12 to P14· 
If those were the only minimum and maximum constraints set, the firm would 
have to seek to maximise its other objectives within this feasible area. 
Figure 4 shows that price P14 would maximise profit and volume (market 
share) and sales (revenue) and price/earnings ratio (determined largely by 
profit) and employee job security (volume of output). 
However, if higher prices militate against the stock turnover rate and 
short-term liquidity, then the liquidity objective would best be satisfied 
at price P12 .
10 The situation of conflicting pressures on price to achieve 
conflicting objectives is better illustrated if the maximum profit con-
straint of Figure 4 is lifted as shown in Figure 5. 
Now, Figure 5 shows that the minimum profit constraint, and the "revised 
minimum total cost curve" determine that the feasible price range is price 
P12 to price P13 . Within those constraints, profit will be maximised at 
price P3 whereas sales (market share) and job security and industrial 
relations will be maximised at price P13 . Revenue will be maximised at 
price P4 and liquidity (on the assumption made in Figure 4)11 will be 
satisfied best at price P12 . Clearly, either a ranking of objectives or a 
compromise will be required in order to set the price and output levels. 
10. See footnote 9 on page 125. 
11. See agai n footnote 9 on page 125 . 
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It must be stressed that Figures 4 and 5 indicate only the manner in which 
the model can be adapted to cope with competing objectives. If it was felt 
that an objective (for example, the liquidity objective) was best satisfied 
by a higher selling price rather than a lower one, then the model would be 
used in the same manner, except that it would illustrate that the liquidity 
objective is best satisfied at price P13 in Figure 5. 
Also, any objective could be ranked as so important as to impose a minimum 
or maximum constraint. For example, the industrial relations objective or 
the job security objective could impose a minimum volume of output at 
volume of output 016. This can be illustrated as shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 shows that this addi t ional constraint to those illustrated 
in Figure 5 would set the feasible price range between price P16 and price 
P13 · 
Further if an objective blocked out a whole range of prices this could also 
be accounted for by the model. Assume that (further to the conditions 
illustrated in Figure 5) an objective rules out all prices in the range P17 
to P1S. This could be represented diagrammatically by a block-out range of 
prices as in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 shows that the feasible ranges of prices then become price P12 to 
price P17 and price P1S to price P13 . 
R 
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5.5 An Independent Role for the Accountant 
An advantage of the profit maximising model is that it can be adjusted to a 
constraint-maximisation model as suggested here. Firstly, this provides 
for an illustration which indicates the feasible range for satisfyi ng 
minimum and maxim imum constraints. Secondly, it illustrates the effects of 
trading off the satisfaction of one objective against another . 
The model's abi lity to illustrate the effects of trading off the 
satisfaction of one objective against that of another is an advantage which 
must not be underestimated. In chapter one we saw that with the growing 
separation of ownership from control of firms, Tri cher (1979) suggested 
that the notion that shareholders control a company at the annua l general 
meeting is a "fiction" (322) . He suggested the need for a "governing body 
demonstrating the legitimacy of corporate activities to outside 
interests" (32). 
Whilst in no sense commenting on the call for a govern ing body, when this 
is read together with the compet ing goals of the different interest groups 
of the firm, it does appear that there may be a role to be played by an 
independent party in the pricing decision, which is a pivotal decision to 
the scale and results of the firm's operat i ons. 
The National Associat ion of Accountants has already suggested that its 
members may wish to consider expanding their role in the pricing decision. 
Thei r study observed that "whether or not management accountants should 
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expand the scope of the informat ion they provide is a normative issue which 
was not part of this empirical study,,12. Commenting on the information 
used in pricing, their study suggeste d: 
"Management accountants may wish to explore the possibility of 
providing some of this additional information to managers" 
(Gordon et ai, 1981: 11). 
As was suggested in chapter one of this study, the chartered accountant/ 
certified public accountant, with his heritage of independence is uniquely 
poised for an independent role in the illustration of the trade-off effects 
of pursuing one objective in favour of another in the multi-disciplinary 
pricing decision. The present study suggests that further research shou ld 
be conducted in order to determine the opinions of chartered 
accountants/certified pub li c accountants as to the potential for an 
increased roll for members of t he profession in the pricing decision and as 
to the nature and extent of that role. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The empirical evidence is that firms do pursue multiple objectives and that 
firms are concerned with profits. 
This study submits that it is a considerable advantage that the profit 
maximising pricing model has the facility for constraint-maximisation 
decision making. The model is superior to the cost-plus approach in coping 
12. See Gordon et ai, 1981: 11. 
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with conflicting objectives. Further. as seen in Figure 2. the maximising 
model can also be used to help raise a satisficing target and to raise 
Leibenstein's (1978) "degree of constraint concern" (26) on the part of 
agent s. 
It would also appear that there may be the potential for an increased role 
to be played by the chartered accountant/certified public accountant in the 
multi-disciplinary pricing decision. 
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Appendix 1 
Ext ract from Gordon et a I (1981 : 16) 
IMPORTANCE OF PRlONG OBJECTIVES BY AVERAGE RESPONSE 
I~ Food Proeeuin, Chemical T~iUpOrtation Heavy Equipment Totab Equ.ipment Pricin& Objective U.S. c. •. ToW U.S, c..n. Tota.! U.S. c..n. ToW U.s. c..n. ToW U.S. c..n. Toto! Std. Dev. 
TotlI Profits ".50 4.83 .... '.5 5.00 4.62 " .61 •. 83 •. 71 5.00 ".66 4 .73 " .59 4.81 4.70 0.55 
Total Sale. 3.33 4.16 3.75 '.00 4.50 4.13 4.20 4.16 4.18 '.00 4.33 4.11 3.86 4.27 ' .06 0.81 
Market Share 3.83 •• 33 4.08 '.00 UO 4.13 4.80 ' .00 4.40 '.00 3.83 3.84 4.14 4.13 4.13 0.8] 
Prior./Earninp 
Ratio 2.33 1.61 1.99 1.37 2.25 1.65 ].20 l.83 Bl 3.00 1.83 2.20 2.27 1.86 2.06 1.31 
Uquidity 2.83 2.42 2.62 2.37 3.00 B. 3.20 3.83 3.51 3.33 2.83 2.96 2.82 ].02 2.91 UO 
Employee Job 
Security 2.82 2.00 2.41 3.25 3.50 3.30 3.60 3.83 3,72 3.67 4.01 :US 3.21 3.30 3.29 1.15 
Industrial 
RelatioN 3.33 2.00 2.67 3.37 3.51 3.38 3.81 3.67 3.14 3.67 3.50 3.52 3.49 3.13 3.32 1.17 
Return on 
investment 4.33 4 .17 4.24 4.37 4.75 4.45 4.82 H3 4.81 3.33 4.33 3.% 4.31 4.50 4.41 0.79 
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Appendix 2 
Extract from Dollery (1983: 216) 
Importance of Pri c ing Objectives 
DISTRIBUTION OF OPTIONS RANKED FIRST BY RESPONDENTS 
SAMPLE 
GROUP 
LOW 
MEDIUM 
HIGH 
MEASURE 
COUNT 
ROW% 
COLUMN% 
TOTAL % 
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63 
66,3 
39,1 
23,4 
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Z >-
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1-"" ..... 
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~LLI-a Vl 
5 
6,5 
31,3 
1,9 
7 
7,4 
43,7 
2,6 
7 
7,4 
25,0 
1,5 
16 
5,9 
u.J 
"" od: ::I: 
Vl 
I-WI-
u.J ::I: u.J 
<.!ll->< 
"" "" od: LL od: I- a ::E 
7 
9,1 
53,8 
2,6 
3 
3,2 
23,1 
1 , ~ 
3 
3,2 
23, 1 
1 , 1 
13 
4,8 
Z 
"" <.!l a OZ~ 
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ZZI-
..... u.J W 
I- > 0.. 
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40,0 
1 ,5 
4 
4,2 
60,0 
2,2 
10 
3,7 
u.J 
...J 
co 
~ 
CD V) 
Z Vl 
..... 0 Vl 
z 0..1-
~ ..... 
od: • LL 
I-XO 
co~"" a c.. 
31 
40,3 
46,3 
11,5 
18 
18,9 
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67 
24,9 
. 
co I-
:::> Z Q.W::E 
::EVl 
<.!l z: ~ 
Z "" U 
..... WVl 
Cl >~ 
..... 01-
Ci <..'J ...... 
> 
"" od: .., U 
2 
2,6 
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0 
0,0 
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.~ 
2 
0,7 
ROW 
TOTAL 
77 
28,6 
95 
35,3 
95 
36,1 
269 
100,0 
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
The present study began with a review of the environment in which the 
pr ici ng decision is made. To this end we examined the alternat ive pricing 
theories of managerial accou nting literature and the three major approaches 
adopted by economists to the study of micro-economic theory from which the 
accountants' pricing theory is derived. In this examination we found that 
the management accounting pricing li terature largely ove rlooked two who le 
schools of thought. namely. the behavioural and managerial schools. It 
generally supports the widespread exclusion of the application of the 
profit maximising pricing model on the grounds of four main arguments which 
are levelled against the model. 
We noted the behavioural theorists' argument that satisficing is a well 
established trait of human behaviour and the managerial school's focus on 
the growing separation of ownership from control of the firm and the 
multiplicity of goals within the firm. Leibenstein (1978) encompassed 
vital principles of both these schools when he pOinted out tha t not only 
could we expect agents to have different interests from their principals 
but that we could also expect them to have different effort levels. 
Conscious of the resulting potential for goal incongruence we decided to 
examine carefully the arguments levelled against the profit maximising 
pricing model in order to determine whether its exclusion could be 
symptomatic of Leibenstein ' s (1978) x-inefficiency. 
What were the findings of the examination of the arguments levelled against 
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the maximising model? 
Chapter two concluded that the argument that the model is only applicable 
under conditions of monopoly and monpolistic competition is incorrect. It 
was found that there is scope for the application of the model in setting 
volume of output in all market structures and there is also scope for the 
use of the model in setting price under some of the many structures of 
oligopolistic competition. 
Chapter three concluded that the argument that the information requirements 
of the cost-plus approach are more easily met than those of the maximising 
model's approach is illusory in that both methods are based on essentially 
similar estimates of cost and revenue data. Furthermore, it was shown t hat 
the maximising model's approach is superior to the cost-plus approach in 
coping with the uncertaint ies inherent in estimations and that, in any 
case, much progress is being made in the field of making such estimations. 
Mindful of the advantages of the model and the fact that it is a more 
effortful approach to pricing decision making, it was concluded that the 
exclusion of the model could be symptomatic of Leibenstein' s (1978) x-
inefficiency. 
Chapter four found that the argument that the maximising model excludes the 
non-price elements of the marketing mix is, quite simply, false. 
Chapter five concluded that in no sense at all does the existence of a 
multiplicity of goals preclude the use of the maximising model. Indeed , it 
was shown that as a constraint-maximisation decision making model, the 
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model is particularly well suited to the complex ities of multiple goal 
incongruence. This corroborated the earlier finding that the model's 
exclusion from pricing decision-making cou ld be symptomatic of 
Leibenstein's (1978) x-inefficiency. The goal incongruence of the 
different constituencies of the firm also led to the conclusion that there 
may well be a role to be played by the chartered accountant/certified 
public accountant as an independent party in the multi-disciplinary pricing 
decision. 
What are the policy proposals which can be deduced from these f indings in 
order to make some contribution to applied knowledge? 
In general terms, the policy implications are two-fold. Firstly, the 
standard coverage of the pricing of manufactured products in the managerial 
accounting literature must be developed and corrected. Secondly, further 
research must be conducted in order to determine the nature and extent of 
the role to be played by the chartered accountant/certified public 
accountant in t he pricing dec ision. 
The literature must be deve loped to encompass the vital principles of the 
behaviourial and managerial schools' approaches to the study of the firm 
and Leibenstein 's (1978) x- inefficiency concept. It must be revised to 
correct the errors discussed above in the arguments most commonly levelled 
against the profit maximising pricing model. 
The research into the potential role of the chartered accountant/cert if ied 
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public accountant should be designed to determine whether his role should 
be in his capacity as an independent party or in the sphere of providing 
more information for this multi -disciplina ry decision or in both of these 
areas. It should also seek to establish whether any significant 
differences of opinion exist between the different constituencies of the 
firm and the different genre of chartered accountants as to the proposal of 
an increased role by the profession in the pricing decision and as to the 
nature and extent of that role. 
A common theme throughout the present study has been the assertion that the 
profit maximising pricing model demands a commitment of the decision 
makers' minds to the different pricing options and an articulation of the 
expected outcomes of the options. The power of the model is that these 
articulated thoughts give the firm knowledge of its opportunities and the 
ability for sustained thought on the pricing decision. 
It is fitting then to conclude this study in the words of Polyani (1973). 
Reconciling the increase in mental powers derived from formal instruments 
of thought with the intuitive act of knowing, he issued the following 
caveat : 
" If everywhere it is the inarticulate which has the last word, 
unspoken and yet decisive, then a corresponding abridgement of 
the status of the spoken truth is inevitable" (71). 
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